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FROM DICTATOR GAME TO ULTIMATUM
GAME... AND BACK AGAIN: THE JUDICIAL
IMPASSE AMENDMENTS
Ellen Dannint
In 1935, Congress decided to replace the "dictator game" that had
long been used to set working conditions with an "ultimatum game" by
enacting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A dictator game is a
two-player economic game in which player one proposes a division of
resources and player two has no choice but to accept the offer. Economic
theory predicts that in such a case, player one will offer nothing to player
two. This is indeed the most common offer.' Before the NLRA was
enacted, the law allowed the employer (player one), to offer terms of
employment and essentially required the employee (player two), to accept
the offer dictated by the employer.
The NLRA was enacted to replace this game with an "ultimatum
game" by changing the balance of power between employers and
employees and creating a system of wage setting that would better support
the institutions of a democracy. 2 In an ultimatum game, player one
t
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3, 13-14 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002). Congress designed the NILRA "to create a
vibrant middle class, with higher wages, as a means of stimulating economic growth" and
"support a prosperous consumer base" and also to quell labor unrest through a mandatory
scheme of collective bargaining. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the
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proposes a division of resources, and, if player two rejects it, neither
receives anything. 3 Economic theory suggests that the first player will
offer a minimal amount to the second player and that the rational second
player will accept any offer greater than zero. When tested, however, this
Player one commonly offers
theory repeatedly has proven false.4
substantially more than the minimum amount and often splits the sum.
Player two tends to punish unfair divisions that is, those not approaching an
even division.5 This dynamic means that proposers (player one) "are more
generous in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game."6 When player
two has the ability to punish noncooperating (or nongenerous) proposers,
proposing players tend to make more even offers.7
In enacting the NLRA, Congress gave employees the ability to punish
an employer who did not make a fair offer by protecting collective action.
The greatest punishment is the strike. As in the ultimatum game, it is a
double-sided weapon; it deprives both the employer and employee of
immediate gains. When employees hold this power, employers are pushed
to be fair.
Of course, economic game theory was unknown in 1935, and
Congress would not have understood what it was doing in these terms
when it enacted the NLRA. However, Congress certainly did conceive of
its actions within economic and social terms. It believed that wage
deflation was caused by inequality of bargaining power between employers
and employees, and it stated that wage deflation and depressed working
conditions were threatening the country's stability and destroying
commerce.' Congress observed that corporate law was to blame for this
inequality because corporate law had enhanced employer power by
transforming them from individuals into collective beings, while leaving
employees with only the power of an individual. 9 Congress decided to
enact legislation that would give employees the right to become an equal
New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REv. 515, 549-51 (2003). Cf.C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century,
51 KAN. L. REv. 77, 92-95 (2002).
3. Roth, supra note 1, at 270; see also Colin F. Camerer, Strategizing in the Brain, 300
SCIENCE 1673, 1673 (June 13, 2003); Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic
Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game, 300 SCIENCE 1755, 1755 (June 13, 2003).
4. Elinor Ostrom, A BehavioralApproach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action: PresidentialAddress, American Political Science Association, 1997, 92 AM. POL.
SCl. REv. 1, 11-12 (1998).
5. Id.
6. Roth, supra note 1, at 270 (citation omitted).
7. Ostrom, supra note 4, at 7-8.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (describing the findings and declaration of policy of the
NLRA).
9. This idea was not specific to the NLRA, rather, it grew out of a general view about
corporations, and particularly large ones. Wells, supra note 2, at 79-80, 85-86, 94-95.
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and opposing collective entity capable of rectifying the imbalance of
bargaining power created by law itself.' ° Therefore, the NLRA protects
worker rights to freedom of association, self-organization, free choice of
bargaining representatives, and meaningful collective bargaining both
affirmatively" and by making employer violations of these rights illegal. 2
Unfortunately, things have not turned out as Congress intended. Since
1935 there has been a return to the status quo ante so that now we live
under a collective bargaining system that is closer to a dictator game than
to the ultimatum game Congress created under the NLRA. Congress itself
played a role in restoring pre-1935 conditions when it amended the NLRA
4
in 1947 and 1958,"3 amendments bitterly condemned by organized labor.
Less noticed, but equally important have been radical judicial
decisions that have "amended" the NLRA to take away the right of
employees to engage in meaningful collective bargaining. Indeed, since
the 1980s, the breadth of revision by the least democratic branch of
government and the implications of this process have so transformed
private sector wage setting that they have returned private employers and
employees to a dictator game.' 5 These judicial decisions are so radical that
they have actually replaced express provisions of the NLRA.
Among the most destructive of these are the "judicial impasse
doctrines" decisions, which deal with the rights of employers and
10. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
11. Id. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) defines the duty to bargain
collectively as the "mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic
Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstandingthe National Labor Relations Act, 71
TEX. L. REV. 921, 970-77 (1993) (describing the motivations behind the passing of the
Wagner Act).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l)-(5) (1994).
13. Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994); Landrum Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
401 et seq. (1990).
14. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
15. Laws affecting work appear particularly prone to this sort of treatment. Labor law
is not the only area of employment law that has experienced this sort of judicial amendment.
The Americans with Disabilities Act is another example. See Katherine R. Annas, Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: Part of an Emerging Trend of Supreme
Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81 N.C. L. REv. 835, 845-47 (2003)
(asserting that the Court's decision suggests that "working" is not to be included among
major life activities, thus profoundly narrowing ADA coverage). Judges in nineteenth
century England rarely enforced aspects of labor contracts that protected employees, while,
at the same time, criminally enforced the same terms against workers. Gunther Peck,
Contracting Coercion? Rethinking the Origins of Free Labor in Great Britain and the
United States, 51 BuFF. L. REv. 201, 204-05 (2003) (book review). For the history of
judicial hostility to worker rights, see generally CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ,
LABOR AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1979).
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employees when they reach an impasse in bargaining. These doctrines,
examined below, allow employers to fire workers who strike, even though
the NLRA explicitly protects that right; to implement changes in terms of
work rather than bargain; and to deunionize, even though the NLRA gives
employees alone the right to choose to be represented by a union or not.
These judicial amendments have taken away the whole point of belonging
to a union. When unions have no power to protect employees, give
workers a voice in their working lives, and improve working conditions;
when workers risk industrial capital punishment when they unionize and
bargain, then unionization becomes less attractive to employees. As a
result, in most workplaces, wages, hours, and terms of work are set by the
dictator-game rules, better known as at-will employment.
This reversion to unilateralism affects far more than just the
workplace. Many argue that work has a moral dimension when it enlists
human beings as partners with God in the work of creation, when it is a
source of dignity, and when it is not seen as the sole end of existence. 6 If
the pursuit of happiness and basic human rights, ideas upon which this
country was founded, include economic rights, 17 then when work is
arranged to obstruct those fights it undercuts a fundamental and necessary
component of American democracy. Some would even argue that when
law denies workers a meaningful role in setting their wages, it recreates a
system of slavery,18 a system rejected by this country a century and a half
ago. Is a workplace that operates as a totalitarian system an institution that
is appropriate to a democracy? Put another way, can those who are trained
to and who do spend most of their waking hours ruled by such a system
operate as citizens of a democracy? Does U.S. labor law deserve its recent
condemnation by Human Rights Watch?1 9 Finally, if the vision of the
NLRA's creators was correct-that a lack of equality of bargaining power

16. See generally Kevin J. Doyle, The Shifting Legal Landscape of Contingent
Employment: A Proposalto Reform Work, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 641 (2003) (discussing
the influences of the principles of Catholic Social Thought on the legal regime governing
contingent employment).
17. See Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic Rights as Human Rights
& the Declarationof Independence: Does the Pursuitof Happiness Require Basic Economic
Rights?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557 (2003) (arguing that basic economic rights are a
necessary part of the Declaration of Independence); see also Lance Compa and Jeffrey S.
Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-year Review, 22 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001) (discussing the history and effect of the Labor Rights Clause
in the United States' General System of Preferences).
18. Peck, supra note 15, at 201-02 (2003).
19. See generallyHUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

(2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor/ (arguing that the rights of
U.S. workers to unionize and bargain collectively are being attacked in the U.S. while the
U.S. government is trying to stop the same kind of right violations abroad).
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and an inability to codetermine wages and other working conditions leads
to the breakdown of our economic system and ultimately our society, 20 do
we fail to act at our peril?
Sadly enough, as this article describes, statutory reform is not the
answer as long as judges blatantly can amend legislation. In such a system,
any labor law passed can readily be subverted.
This article examines the judicial activism that has so dramatically
rewritten one of this country's basic human rights laws.
I. THE JUDICIAL HI-JACKING OF THE NLRA

A.

The Decisions That Have Brought Us to Where We Are Today

Although its original language is largely intact, the NLRA today is a
far different law than when first enacted, largely as a result of judicial
interpretations so broad, they actually override the NLRA's express
language.2' This is often far from a subtle process. Consider the Supreme
Court's 1992 opinion in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 22 Critical to the opinion
was whether union organizers were employees or not. Section 2(3) of the
NLRA states: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.
,23 However,
not only did the Lechmere majority not mention that the statute had a
definition for employee, it created a definition of employee that directly
contradicted the statute; the Court defined employee as being limited to the
24
employees
of anarrowest
particular range
employer
and and
as amade
result,it confined
employee
rights to the
possible
more difficult
to

20. NLRA § I concludes:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151.
21. As used in this article, the term judge includes members of the National Labor
Relations Board. At times it has been the Board that has radically reshaped the NLRA. This
was particularly true during the 1980s when the Reagan Board pursued a course of
unparalleled judicial activism.
22. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). The language of § 2(3) was carefully drafted and is the
result of a long legislative and judicial history. See GREGORY & KATZ, supra note 15, at
341-474 (discussing the legislative and judicial history of the Act).
24. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531-32.
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25

organize a union.
Through other decisions judges have created a series of doctrines that
effectively have removed NLRA § l's goals of promoting equality of
bargaining power, encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining, and "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection., 26 These activist
decisions have replaced the NLRA's rights with ones that give employers
rights to unilaterally set working conditions, to fire workers who have
engaged in collective action for mutual aid and protection, and to usurp the
employees' right to designate representatives of their own choosing. These
judicial amendments eviscerate the ultimatum game the NLRA was meant
to be and recreate the dictator game that existed before the NLRA was
enacted.
As an ultimatum game, NLRA collective bargaining was designed to
push the parties to resolve disputes themselves. It left it to the employer
and employees acting collectively to use virtually any weapons at their
disposal to achieve their goals. Although the law gave both wide ambit for
action, there were limits-but only a few and only those necessary to
maintaining the integrity of the ultimatum game. An employer could not
discriminate against employees for joining or assisting unions, 2 could not
create a sham/company union," nor interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of a wide range of concerted activities. 29 An
employer also violated the law if it "refuse[d] to bargain collectively with
the representatives of [its] employees . .. ,30 But nothing prohibited an
employer from pressuring workers by locking them out or unions from
pressuring employers by striking. Nothing prohibited workers from
engaging in sit-down strikes or slowdowns. Nothing forced the parties to
agree to any term or to reach an agreement at all. In other words, once the
law helped the employees become collective, it left them and the employer
to use whatever market power or powers of persuasion they had in
25. See generally, Ellen Dannin, Teaching Labor Law Using Socio-Economic
Methodology, 41 U. SAN Dmoo. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
27. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
28. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
29. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
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negotiating, as long as they did not commit a handful of illegal actions.31
Should a bargaining impasse occur, it was not to be resolved by anything
that would
compel anyone to make a compact of any kind if no terms are
arrived at that are satisfactory to him. The very essence of
collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to withdraw
if its conditions are not met. But the right of workers to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing must
be matched by the correlative duty of employers to recognize and
deal in good faith with these representatives.
In other words, reaching an impasse left the parties with the status quo.
None of this describes today's private sector collective bargaining,
even though the relevant legislative structure is virtually untouched. With
the exception of legislative changes that outlawed secondary boycotts,33 the
most important amendments have come through administrative and judicial
opinions that have given employers the right to permanently replace
strikers;14 taken away a union's ability to maintain discipline during a
strike; 35 expanded the right of employers to lock out workers; 36 severely
limited who is or is not an employee and thus protected by the Act; 37 and

31. Gary Chaison observes that the Wagner Act assumes a system of worker
representation in which is embedded assumptions of industrial pluralism-the idea "that
unions should act as counterweights to the power of employers and impose a system of selfgovernance at the workplace through the negotiation and enforcement of collective
agreements." Gary Chaison, Information Technology: The Threat to Unions, 23 J. LAB.
RESEARCH 249, 250 (2002).
32. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2335-36 (1935).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994). These were enacted in 1947 as part of Taft-Hartley's
addition of § 8(b) which designated certain acts union unfair labor practices.
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (holding that a
company could discharge or threaten to discharge striking employees); see also Matthew W.
Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547,
548. (describing how, in recent years, employers have been resorting increasingly to
permanent replacement of striking workers). For an analysis of recent union attempts to
circumvent Mackay, see Rodney B. Sorensen, Crossing the Picket Line in Support of the
Union: The New Flavorof Salting, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165 (1997).
35. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (affirming the Board's
decision that union fines on resigning strikers constituted unfair labor practices).
36. See Michael H. LeRoy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical
Public Policy Analysis and Proposal to Balance Economic Weapons Under the NLRA, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 981 (1996) (providing empirical research regarding employers' use of
lockouts); James B. Zimarowski, A Primeron Power Balancing Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 47, 53 n. 16 (1989) (discussing the Board's granting
employers the right to use temporary workers during an offensive lockout).
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nat'l Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (holding
that Board's test determining if nurses are supervisors was inconsistent with the statutory
provision); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (holding that University's fulltime faculty members are managerial employees and thereby are excluded from the Act's
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created new methods for deunionizing. 38 More rarely seen but also
important are judicial decisions that eliminate economic weapons such as
the sitdown, 9 slowdown, 4° and partial strike4' and that have placed off
limits the obligation to bargain about issues that profoundly affect
employees-union rights to be notified and to bargain about decisions to
transfer, change, or close operations. 42 Judicial amendments now limit
workers' rights to equality of bargaining power in unionized workplaces
across the country.43 Such weak protection for NLRA rights means unions
have less to offer unorganized workers and makes union representation not
worth the risk.
Each of these judicial amendments utterly defies express NLRA
language. Although each of the judicial amendments to NLRA collective
bargaining discussed here are independently important, their full impact on
destroying employees' NLRA rights can only be understood as a whole.

coverage); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (holding that the NLRB
can adjudicate on a case-by-case basis whether certain buyers are "managerial employees").
38. See, e.g., Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (holding employers may
only withdraw recognition from incumbent union if it has lost the support of the majority of
the bargaining unit employees).
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (holding that
employees can be discharged if they engage in a seizure and forcible retention of an
employer's factory building, essentially leaving sitdowns unprotected). Economic weapons
such as slowdowns, sitdowns, and partial strikes do not violate the NLRA but rather,
constitute unprotected means of engaging in concerted activities. The sanction is that the
NLRB allows the employer to discipline or discharge the employee for engaging in those
concerted activities. Zimarowski, supra note 36, at 97.
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (noting that
slowdowns are unprotected, but not an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(3)); Elk Lumber Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (discussing the treatment of slowdowns).
41. See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1978) (holding that intermittent
work stoppages are unprotected).
42. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-79 (1981) (discussing whether
an employer must engage in collective bargaining); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203 (1964) (affirming the Board's decision to direct company to resume
maintenance operations and to continue bargaining with the union); Dubuque Packing Co.,
303 N.L.R.B. 386, 390-92 (1991), enforced in part, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing
factors used in employer decisions to relocate a work unit and hence engage in mandatory
bargaining). The Supreme Court also has given the right to unilaterally alter the pension
rights of retirees. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (holding that "modification" of a collective bargaining
contract, even if unilateral and mid-term, is a prohibited unfair labor practice only when it
changes a term which is a mandatory rather than permissive subject of bargaining).
43. Brudney contends that since 1970, unions have fared substantially worse with
regard to Supreme Court interpretations of NLRA rights. James J. Brudney, Reflections on
Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1572-91 (1996).
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The JudicialAmendment Permitting Striker Replacement

Within a few years of the NLRA's enactment, the Supreme Court
44
gave employers the right to replace workers who went on strike.
Permanent replacement of strikers and the representation process have long
been the subject of intense scholarly and legislative attention and
condemnation.45
It is simply impossible to square allowing an employer to permanently
replace an employee who has done no more than strike with the plain
language of the NLRA. Sanctioning permanent replacement allows an
employer to discharge an employee for engaging in lawful activities.
Section 13 unambiguously protects the right to strike: "Nothing in this
Subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right., 46 In
addition, an employer violates § 8(a)(3) if it discriminates against an
employee in hire or tenure because of the employee's union activities.47
Section 8(a)(1) forbids employer actions that restrain, coerce, or interfere
with employee § 7 rights "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all such activities .... ,,4
If sections 7, 13, and 8(a)(1) and (3) are to have meaning, they must
proscribe actions that directly and indirectly violate their express language.
Yet although striking is a union and a concerted activity, although it is a
concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or assistance, and although it also assists a labor organization, the
courts have contradicted the NLRA's express language and effectively
amended the Act by permitting an employer to violate all of these rights
when it permanently replaces a striker.4 9 Even if permanent replacement of

44. See, e.g., Mackay, 304 U.S. 333 (holding that employers could replace striking
workers).
45. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at pt. I (studying the effect of
replacement workers on unions). For an overview of law review articles and legislative
responses, see Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics,
and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 363-67 (1995) (attacking the alleged
economic efficiency of the Mackay doctrine); Michael H. LeRoy, Institutional Signals and
Implicit Bargains in the ULP Strike Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 172 n.7 (1999) (examining the declining right to strike in labor law).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
49. James Zimarowski observes:
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strikers did not violate the Act's express language, it certainly undercuts
the stated purposes of the Act. An employer's power to replace strikers
profoundly rebalances bargaining power.50
A worker who can be
permanently replaced for striking is a worker who will be reluctant to take
advantage of the right to freedom of association, self-organization, and
other mutual aid or protection and whose bargaining power is decreased
rather than being made more equal with the employer.
Striker replacement is not an aberration. It operates with other judicial
amendments to individually and collectively eviscerate NLRA rights.
C. JudicialDevelopments in Lockout Rights
An employer's right to lock out is an economic weapon that, in many
ways, seems to be equivalent to the employee's right to strike. Both exert
economic pressure to force a bargaining partner to agree to an offer.
Unlike strikes, however, lockouts exist in a difficult tension with the
prohibitions of § 8(a)(1) and (3). A lockout literally punishes employees
for engaging in rights protected by § 7 and for the union activity of
collective bargaining. Lockouts now tend to last for years. 5' Because the
The distinction between being permanently replaced and being discharged is
lost on most employees.
The employer is, of course, prohibited from
discriminatorily denying reemployment to the replaced worker. The replaced
worker continues as an "employee" until rehired, or until she finds suitable
substitute employment, and is relieved of employment selection process
hurdles, can vote in representational elections within twelve months of
severance, and has preferential recall rights. Economic reality, however, will
induce even the most diehard union member to seek other means of support
during this interim period. A right to permanently replace striking workers,
read in context with sections' 7 and 13 protections from interference with lawful
concerted activity, raises significant NLRA policy problems because, as one
noted labor law scholar observed, "one can conceive of few interferences
greater than permanent replacement for striking."
Zimarowski, supra note 36, at 98.
50. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at pt. II (asserting that permanent
replacement undercuts a fundamental right of workers); John W. Budd, Canadian Strike
Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining:Lessons for the United States, 35 IND.
REL. 245 (1996) (analyzing Canadian data to suggest that the presence or absence of
legislation prohibiting employers from hiring replacement workers significantly affects
bargaining power relationships).
51. Lockouts are lasting increasingly long periods. Michael LeRoy found that before
HarterEquipment, in 1986, 31% of replacement lockouts lasted more than one year. After
Harter, 75% of replacement lockouts lasted more than one year. He concluded that that
decision had contributed to a substantial prolongation of replacement lockouts. LeRoy,
supra note 36, at 1023.
LeRoy also found that lockouts begun in 1982 lasted an average of 96 days; in 1983
for 120 days; in 1984 for 67 days. After Harter, the length of lockouts increased
dramatically: in 1987 for 652 days; in 1988 for 612 days; in 1989 for 778 days; in 1990 for
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employer controls the start and the end of the lockout, a lockout is close to
a discharge if long-term. In contrast, striking to exert economic pressure
does not violate the law, so employees have a legal right to choose whether
and when to strike or to end a strike and return to their jobs (assuming they
have not been permanently replaced).52 No statute protects an employer's
right to lock out employees.
Taken further, an employer that locks out its employees for years
because they refuse to agree to the employer's proposal and then hires new
employees to do their work has effectively fired them. Firing employees
for refusing to agree to an employer's offer should lead to a finding that the
employer violated § 8(a)(3) for discharging workers for their union
activities; § 8(a)(1) for interfering with, restraining and coercing workers
for engaging in concerted activities to provide mutual support to one
another with regard to their wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment; and § 8(a)(5) for bargaining in bad faith by using a technique
that violated workers' legal rights.5 3
In the early days of the NLRA, the courts recognized -that lockouts are
not equivalent to strikes and could easily violate the purpose of the law. If
a lockout has the potential to infringe on NLRA rights, the ability to
replace locked out workers certainly does. In its most destructive form, an
employer could lock out workers and replace them, but never end the
lockout. The resulting discharge for union and concerted activities also
could allow an employer to destroy the union's power to represent the
workers. In the past, the courts were thus careful to severely circumscribe
the right to lock out. More recently, however, courts have dramatically
expanded the employer's right to lock out. Courts have moved away from
permitting employers to lock out only defensively, that is, to lock out only

1087 days; and in 1991 for 1010 days. Id. at 1027.
52. Furthermore, although parallels exist in the purposes of lockouts and strikes, it
cannot be forgotten that they take place in a context in which employers generally have
greater power than do employees, including the power to weather a lockout or strike
situation. An employer who is faced with a strike or lockout potentially can stockpile
products, shift the work to supervisors, nonunit employees, other work units, or
subcontractors, or can increase productivity through the purchase of machinery. Employees
faced with a strike or lockout can look for temporary work or rely on income from family
members, strike benefits, charity, or potentially unemployment benefits, although they
generally are not available in fact. Even though these courses of action seem parallel in
providing for an income stream for the employer and employee, the different situations of
the parties mean these options are less certainly available for the employee than for the
employer. For example, while employers can order supervisors or non-unit employees to do
the work created by the strike, employees cannot order another employer to hire them. Of
course, the factors that affect employers or employees during a strike are many and
complex, and there may be situations in which an employer can be more damaged by
economic action than can an employee.
53. Cf Estlund, supra note 11, at 933-36.

252

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 6:2

to protect a multi-employer bargaining group from being whipsawed when
a union strikes only one employer in the group or to preempt a union's
ability to choose a time to strike that would most injure the employer.5 4 In
1965, employers were allowed to lock out offensively as well, that is, to
place economic pressure on a union to agree to an employer's offer.55
A parallel course of judicial decisions has removed restrictions that
once prevented employers from hiring replacement workers during a
lockout. Before 1986, employers were allowed to use only temporary
replacements and then only in defensive lockouts. In 1986, the Reagan
NLRB decided that employers could use temporary replacements during
offensive lockouts as well.56
The most dramatic judicial rewriting of the NLRA and legalizing of
what is in essence a violation of § 8(a)(3) came in the D.C. Circuit's 1997
decision in InternationalPaperv. NLRB.57 The court allowed the employer
to permanently displace 51 the workers it had locked out. 9 In International
6 ° the parties began bargaining
Paper,
for a successor contract in early
January 1987. On February 20, the employer presented its "best and final"
offer and said it would lock out the employees if the union did not accept it.
On March 7, after the offer was rejected, International Paper (IP)
54. Compare NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No.449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S.
87 (1957) (identifying conditions where an employer legally may lock out employees) with
Quaker State Oil Refining, 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958) (describing negotiation circumstances
in which an employer's lockout was illegal).
55. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
56. See, e.g. Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986), aff'd sub nom., Operating
Eng'rs Local 825 v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). Of this trend, Zimarowski notes:
It presents a common balancing of interests problem under the NLRA. It should
be noted that a strike had not been called. The employees were ready and
willing to continue their labor, and although the contract had expired, the parties
were still at the bargaining table. Balancing the employees' statutory rights
against an employer's prerogative to continue operations on its own unilateral
terms, the Board held that using temporary replacements during an offensive
lockout had "a comparatively slight adverse effect on protected employee
rights." The Board almost reverently approached the employer's prerogative
and power to continue operations using ostensibly temporary replacements.
One can view the Board's methodological approach as highly suspect in light of
labor history and NLRA policy. "We reject the argument that the Board should
require more proof of an employer's legitimate purpose in such a case or should
engage in balancing employer interests against employee rights to determine
whether the Act has been violated, even in the absence of independent proof of
unlawful employer motivation."
Zimarowski, supra note 36, at 53 n.16 (citation omitted).
57. 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
58. The word "displace" is used here to distinguish this scenario from striker
replacement.
59. Int'l Paper Co., 115 F.3d at 1045.
60. Id. at 1046.
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unilaterally implemented its proposal and then hired temporary
replacements through BE&K. 6 On March 21, it locked out its Mobile,
Alabama employees, to prevent what it said would be whipsawing.62
During the lockout, IP gave the union a proposal stating that IP could,
"'at its option, contract out any or all mill maintenance work on a
temporary or permanent basis."' 6 3 The unions insisted they were willing to
bargain about the subcontracting proposal. To have done otherwise would
have put them at impasse and given the employer the ability to implement
its final offer, but there was no doubt that the union was strongly opposed.
One representative said, "'[D]o you think that we are going to give up 280
jobs? We want to stay alive. You're going to get us killed.' '64 On August
11, IP declared an impasse and implemented a permanent subcontract of
the maintenance work, thus, as the 65court of appeals put it, "fulfilling its
bargaining obligations on the issue.,
The court reached this conclusion because it looked only at each
discrete action by IP, deracinated from its legal context, and concluded
that, since each step was sanctioned by law, so too must be the whole act.
Thus, past judicial decisions said employers have the right to lock out
employees, so the lockout was legal. 66 IP was also permitted to hire
temporary replacements to fill the locked out workers' jobs. IP had the
right to propose that it have the right to subcontract this bargaining unit
work permanently and solely at its discretion. The union could have
acceded to the employer's demand, but had it done so it would have
committed institutional suicide. The employer must have known that the
union could never agree to this term and that therefore the parties would
certainly and quickly reach an impasse. When the union refused to agree,
IP declared that the parties were at impasse and, as it had the legal right to
do, implemented the subcontracting proposal and then subcontracted the
work, permanently as far as the union knew. With that act, the employer de
facto discharged the unit employees, destroyed the bargaining unit, and
ended the union's status as the unit's representative.
Had the court looked at all these acts in the aggregate, it would have

61. Unilateral implementation is discussed below.
See infra notes 68-90 and
accompanying text.
62. Int'l PaperCo., 115 F.3d at 1047.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. This conclusion was probably wrong because IP had already unilaterally
implemented its final offer. As a result, it had no offer on the table and thus no reason to
exert economic pressure. It also could not characterize the lockout as a defensive lockout,
because all of its competitors were other International Paper plants.
67. The employer's right to implement its final offer at impasse is discussed below. See
infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text.

254

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 6:2

seen that what IP had done was discharge employees solely for not
agreeing to the employer's offer, an act that violates § 8(a)(3) and (5).
Even had the court failed to consider the express language of the NLRA, it
might have asked how permitting an employer to pursue this course of
action furthers the Act's goals of promoting equality of bargaining power
and collective bargaining.
Indeed, had the court thought about the parties' actions and their
meanings, it would have seen that IP was in no danger of a strike. The
union had said it would not strike despite the parties' failure to reach an
agreement. A thoughtful court ought to have found this curious and, had it
considered the matter, would have understood that the union could not
strike because it was afraid IP would permanently replace the strikers. The
court would have also seen that the union faced an employer to which the
law had given the power to dictate an offer that the union had no power to
reject and to use the most extreme measures to enforce that power. The
statute said that the dictator game had ended in 1935. The courts say
otherwise.68
D. Looking at the Role Implementation upon Impasse Plays
In its iteration of the dictator game, International Paper twice
implemented its final offer upon reaching a bargaining impasse. Indeed,
though less dramatic than a lockout or than displacing or replacing a
worker, IP could not have achieved its ends had the courts not given
employers the power to implement their final offers upon impasse. 69 This
68. The Board has not acquiesced in this interpretation and so far, no court has followed
it. It is thus impossible to say that this will be the law. Yet this trend is one that should
concern those who support legalized collective bargaining. Workers who are unwilling to
capitulate to any offer their employer makes can be locked out and then permanently
displaced. Fairfield Tower Condo. Ass'n, ALJD-54-02, Case No. 29-CA-24243 (Sept. 24,
2002).
International Paperis so close to permitting discharge for refusing to agree to an
employer's offer-an act that would be a clear violation of § 8(a)(3)-that it is difficult to
see any difference. Will the Court's next step be to decide that permanent replacement after
a lockout is legal? If this is legal under the NLRA, then what is left of the NLRA's policy
of promoting collective bargaining?
69. See, e.g., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 639-43 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992)
(discussing conditions in which it is either permissible or impermissible for an employer to
take unilateral action upon reaching impasse). To further explore the doctrine and its
development, see J. Gilmer Bowman, An Employer's UnilateralAction-An Unfair Labor
Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REV. 487 (1956); Ellen J. Dannin, Collective Bargaining, Impasse
and the Implementation of Final Offers: Have We Created a Right Unaccompanied by
Fulfillment?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 41 (1987) [hereinafter Dannin, Fulfillment]; Ellen J.
Dannin, Legislative Intent and Impasse Resolution Under the National Labor Relations Act:
Does Law Matter?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 11 (1997) [hereinafter Dannin,
Legislative Intent]; David G. Epstein, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEx. L. REV.
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doctrine and its implications have not received as much attention as
replacement or lockouts, but implementation gives employers the power to
destroy collective bargaining.
If workers had the power to engage in an effective strike, if employers
could not lock out workers, if employers could not hire replacements in
either strikes or lockouts, and if employers could not hire permanent
replacements, then implementation upon impasse might have less impact.
In that world, any time the employer reached an impasse and said it
planned to implement its final offer, the workers would walk out and there
would be no one left upon whom those terms could be imposed.
Eventually the employer or the union or both would conclude that it or they
could not continue without workers or without work, and they would go
back to the table and work out an agreement. Equal bargaining partners
would flex their economic power to co-determine workplace terms. We
would see the purchasing power of wage earners increase and wages and
working conditions stabilize within and between industries. The strike
would give workers voice by giving them a way to tell their employer what
they want and ensuring that the employer would hear their message. 70 It
allows workers to punish the employer who makes an inadequate offer.
Yet the pain a strike inflicts on workers would mean that this punishment
would not be administered lightly. This is the ultimatum game world the
NLRA was supposed to have created.
But that is not the world in which private sector collective bargaining
takes place today. Instead, employees do not strike because they fear
replacement. 7 The employer negotiates secure in the knowledge that if the
union does not agree to the employer's offer, the employer has the right to
impose whatever terms it wants without regard to their reasonableness or
value to the workplace or society. 72 Employers know they can rid
themselves of any employees who strike and, if the employees are afraid to
769 (1966); Joseph E. Kolick & Merle M. DeLancey, Can One Unilaterally Gain the Right
to Make UnilateralChanges in Working Conditions?, 9 LAB. LAW. 137 (1993); Terrence H.
Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1 (1977);
George Schatzki, The Employer's UnilateralAct-A Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 470 (1966); Mark Stolzenburg, Note, Blind Faith or Efficiency? The Differences
Between the Fifth Circuit and All Others on the Topic of Private Sector Impasse

Bargaining,80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341 (2002).
70. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 94-110
(1984) (discussing the union voice effect on exit behavior).
71. In 2001, the total number of strikes fell to historic lows, and just three public sector
strikes accounted for 40% of all workers on strike. Total Work Stoppages Fall in 2001 to
Historic Low of 29 Strikes or Lockouts, 59 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-9 (Mar. 27, 2002).
72. Although theory would suggest that employers would be rational actors and would
not insist to the point of impasse on terms that are of no value to them, this is not necessarily
the case. See, e.g., Dannin, Legislative Intent, supra note 69, at 18 n.39 (describing a
situation where employer insisted to impasse on terms it could not use).
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strike, the employer can force them off the job and then replace them. In
this world, not agreeing with the employer is not an option. If the union
agrees to (or capitulates to) what the employer demands, the employer gets
what it wants. If the union does not agree to what the employer demands,
the employer gets what it wants. Workers have no effective voice
mechanism because judges have amended the law to allow employers to
turn a deaf ear to employee preferences. The results of this interplay of
power, this return to the dictator game, bleed into society and the economy
and affect us all. 3
Implementation upon impasse affects both the process of collective
bargaining and the resulting terms of employment, the substance of
bargaining.74 In the hands of those who understand labor law and collective
bargaining and who have the will to press its use to the maximum,
implementation upon impasse can be used to redefine bargaining power.
Although it formally operates only when the parties are deadlocked, in fact,
it casts a long shadow backward, shaping behavior throughout
negotiations.75 It allows an employer to fulfill all of its obligations to

73. Paula Voos observed of bargaining in the 1980s:
As tactics to gain leverage, some employers used threats of work relocation,
hired permanent replacements in strike situations, and/or unilaterally
implemented terms and conditions of employment where workers decided a
The underlying context of high unemployment,
strike was ill-advised ....
increased competition, and the increasingly evident problems faced by unions in
organizing workers and keeping them organized, all facilitated confrontational
bargaining.
Paula B. Voos, Introduction: An Economic Perspective on Contemporary Trends in
Collective Bargaining,in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

1, 3 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994).
74. Bronfenbrenner found that employers engaged in hard bargaining on union security
clauses in 50% of cases, reducing the likelihood of gaining a contract from 92% to 68%;
declared impasse and implemented final offers in 7% of cases, reducing agreement from
82% to 57%; forced a strike through unacceptable demands in 7% of cases, reducing
agreement from 85% to 14%; and organized a decertification campaign in 14% of cases,
with the agreement rate dropping from 88% to 29%. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer
Behavior in Certification Elections and First-ContractCampaigns: Implicationsfor Labor
Law in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 85 tbl. 5.2 (Sheldon
Friedman et al. eds., 1994). Another study found unilateral implementation by management
of its last offer in 23% of negotiations. Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., Collective
Bargaining in Small Firms: PreliminaryEvidence of Fundamental Change, 49 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 195, 204-05 (1996).
75. A negotiation simulation found strong evidence of this effect across three different
regimes for resolving bargaining impasses. Ellen Dannin & Gangaram Singh, The Force of
Law on Collective Bargaining Strategies: Empirical Research and Labor Law Reform
(2002) (unpublished paper on file with author) [hereinafter Dannin & Singh, The Force of
Law]; Gangaram Singh & Ellen Dannin, Law and Collective Bargaining Power: Results of a
Simulated Study (2002) (unpublished paper on file with author) [hereinafter Singh &
Dannin, Simulated Study].
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bargain while driving straight toward unilateral action. An employer who
wants to reach an impasse and implement can simply offer its wish list,
knowing it will be unacceptable to the union. A truly savvy and driven
employer can use implementation upon
• • 76 impasse alone or with replacement
and/or lockout to legally de-unionize; to use the legal methods to usurp
rights the NLRA meant to give only to employees, and to recreate the
dictator game.
The next sections present theory and knowledge about implementation
upon impasse and then consider its operation in conjunction with the other
judicial amendments that have collectively reestablished the pre-NLRA
world.
1. Theory
When an employer and union reach a bona fide impasse in collective
bargaining, the employer is allowed to implement all or any part of its final
offer.77 Implementation upon impasse is justified on the ground that: it
"allows limited unilateral action by an employer" when there is a goodfaith deadlock in negotiations; it is "a judicial invention used to reconcile
the dual mandate of the National Labor Relations Act-to enforce the duty
of good-faith bargaining while not compelling parties to accept agreements
or make concessions"; and that it is traditionally "viewed as a tool to
promote an ongoing bargaining process.,, 78 This traditional view, however,
is difficult, even impossible, to reconcile either with traditional contract
law or with the language and purposes of the NLRA.
a. Implementation upon Impasse Comparedwith Contract
Theory
Imagine that contract law allowed the buyer to impose its offer on the
seller whenever their negotiations were deadlocked. No doubt, the parties
would adjust to such a law and gradually develop strategies to promote

76. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. LeRoy reaches a similar conclusion
but only in the context of striker replacement. Michael H. LeRoy, Severance of Bargaining
Relationships During Permanent Replacement Strikes and Union Decertifications: An
Empirical Analysis and Proposal to Amend Section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1019 (1996).
77. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 69, at 639-43 (discussing unilateral
implementation by employer of proposed contract changes); see also Dannin, Fulfillment,
supra note 69 (discussing impasse doctrine and its development).
78. Thomas C. Albus, Head 'em Off at the Impasse!: A Victory for Management in the

War to Implement its "Last Best Offer," 1996 J. Disp. RESOL. 429, 429; see also Peter
Guyon Earle, The Impasse Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1988) (discussing history
and application of the impasse doctrine).
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their respective interests. For example, the buyer who wanted to impose its
offer might try to reach impasse so it could impose its terms, and the seller
would try to prevent an impasse, perhaps by making small concessions to
show they were not deadlocked, while not wholly capitulating. Or the
seller might realize it had no choice but to capitulate. In every stage of
every negotiation the parties would be aware of these powers and be
vigilant for either the chance to use them or to prevent their being used.
Buyers who developed a reputation for egregiously harsh behavior might
find no sellers, if the sellers could find alternate buyers who would
negotiate with them. Harsh buyers who then felt the discipline of the
market might modify their strategies. In other words, sellers with options
would use exit as a strategy to signal their preferences, and buyers would
modify their tactics based on that signaling.
Exit in the employment area is less likely to discipline opportunistic
employer behavior because of many complex factors. In particular, unless
all workers quit, as opposed to only one or several workers quitting, and
unless the employer actually learns why they have quit, there is far weaker
signaling than in the case of a commercial buyer.
Of course, contract bargaining is not perfectly analogous to collective
bargaining. It most clearly deviates in one fundamental respect. In
contract bargaining, the contract creates and governs the relationship. The
seller has a choice as to which buyer to negotiate with and whether to
negotiate at all or to walk away when there is an impasse. But walking
away--other than for a short time-is not a real option in employment and,
therefore, in collective bargaining. Although employment has contractual
elements, it is also a relationship. That status exists regardless of the
outcome of bargaining. 79 Employment tends to be or is intended to be
more long term, complex, and rooted in interpersonal relations. It is based
more on an amalgam of status, custom, and layers of informal and formal
undertakings that are constantly re-calibrated to meet new situations than is
a nonrelational contract. In addition, employment disruptions spill over the
boundaries of the workplace. As a result society, as well as the parties,
need the employment relationship to continue and therefore need disputes
between the parties to be resolved. This creates pressure to resolve
employment impasses that keeps the parties in the relationship.
Furthermore, the relational nature of employment makes exit for the
seller of labor far more difficult than is the case with a short-term
commercial contract. Perhaps the best commercial analogy would be
housing. Employees' relationships to their jobs put them in situations akin
to those of most home owners. Over time, both workers and home owners
79. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (holding that preexisting individual
employment contracts do not preclude union elections nor do they allow the employer to
refuse collective bargaining negotiations).
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accrue equity that makes leaving difficult and costly. Benefits, seniority
entitlements, firm-specific knowledge, social ties, fear of the unknown, the
emotional and practical difficulty of searching for another job, and the cost
and disruption of moving to another geographic area often tie a worker to a
specific employer and job, even when the worker is dissatisfied.
If the economy is good, if the employee has skills that are in demand,
and if the market for workers in general is tight, the accumulated human
capital may be valuable and allow the worker to trade up, despite having to
leave many accrued benefits behind. When conditions are reversed, no
matter how little the job suits the worker, it may be impossible to find a
better situation. Employment is unlike housing, however, in that as
workers age they. reach a point at which they have or can create no capital
that any other employer desires. When these are the conditions, employers
can most easily impose terms.
b. Implementation upon Impasse Considered in the Context of
NLRA Law and Policies

Just as with striker replacement and lockout, implementation upon
impasse violates express NLRA law and policies. Nothing in the NLRA
says that anything other than collective bargaining is intended to set wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment. The very purpose of the
NLRA is to restore equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees and to do so by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. 8° The goals set out in § 1 are promoted by § 7's
employee rights, which include the right to organize, to form or join labor
organizations, to select bargaining representatives, and then to bargain
through those representatives.81 When an employer seeks impasse and
denigrates the role of the employees' representative rather than bargaining,
this interferes with, restrains, and coerces employees, thus violating their
rights under § 158(a)(1). 82
Section 159(a)8 3 gives an employee representative the right and
obligation to bargain on behalf of employees as to wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment, and § 152(5) defines the essence of a labor
organization as representing employees and as existing for the purpose of
dealing with employers concerning "grievances, labor disputes, wages,
80. 29 U.S.C. § 151. Although this paper talks only of private sector negotiations, this
method of impasse resolution has also been adopted in some public sector collective
bargaining laws.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
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rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 84 Section
158(a)(5) enforces this right by proscribing a refusal to bargain collectively
with a union, 85 and § 8(d) defines bargaining collectively as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ....
The Supreme Court has held that an employer's unilaterally
81
implementing terms violates the duty to bargain in good faith.
Yet in
creating the doctrine of implementation upon impasse, the courts have
acted as though nothing exists in § 8(d) but its last phrase: that nothing
compels making a concession or agreeing to a proposal.
Giving an employer the right to implement its final offer alters
collective bargaining procedurally and thus substantively. These changes
are so profound that they not only change NLRA bargaining, but can also
rewrite union organizing. An employer who bargains must compromise
and will not get all it wants. Allowing an employer to implement its final
offer at impasse rewards an employer who eschews the give and take of
bargaining by giving the employer its wish list. Differences may be
narrowed under both an NLRA regime and an implementation regime, but
there is an enormous difference in the way those disparities are bridged.
Rather than seeking compromise, an implementation regime invites an
employer to increase the distance between the parties. The union's only
recourse to this strategy is to make concessions to decrease differences and
thus demonstrate that they are not at impasse. 88 As a result, the parties
move from the NLRA's ultimatum game in which fairness for all parties is
a key consideration to a dictator game in which one party can impose its
will on the other.
There are other ways to understand the distinctions between NLRA
and implementation bargaining. As a thought experiment, consider being a
party who is told to choose the role-as an employer or union under either
an NLRA or implementation bargaining regime-that would give it the

84. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).

86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
88. See, e.g., TNT Skypak, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 468 (1999), aff'd, 208 F.3d 362 (2d Cir.

2000).
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most power to achieve its desires and to identify the role that would make it
least likely to achieve its bargaining desires. The party would see that the
role of employer in implementation bargaining would give it the most
power and that of union the least. The roles of employer and union under
NLRA bargaining would fall between those two poles, and it would be
difficult to predict just from this information which party would have the
greatest power in any one negotiation. In other words, in the case of
implementation bargaining, the law loads the dice and all but dictates the
outcome. In the case of NLRA bargaining, an array of factors, including
the economy, leadership, intelligence, and the needs of the enterprise would
play more important roles.
Collective bargaining as a dictator game leads to poorer bargaining
outcomes for unions and better ones for employers-but better only in the
sense that employers would get more of what they want-than would be
the case if this power did not exist. But does having and using the power to
implement upon impasse really lead to better outcomes for an employer, let
alone for workers and society as a whole? In recent years, many have
supported labor-management cooperation because of the importance of
communication to the success of a workplace. 9 An employer who can
implement terms may feel it does not need to listen, and refusing to listen
may mean the employer is not operating at its highest efficiency.90
89.

See U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LAB.-MGMT.

REL. AND COOPERATIVE

PROGRAMS, Labor-Managementand the Duty of Fair Representation, in U.S. LAB. LAW
AND THE FUTURE OF LAB.-MGMT. COOPERATION, SECOND INTERIM REPORT 39 (discussing

the doctrine of duty of fair representation and the development of labor-management

cooperation); 1995 U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Section II, pts. 2-4 (discussing employee
participation in labor-management cooperation); Arthur J. Martin, Company Sponsored
REL.,

Employee Involvement: A Union Perspective, 40 St. LOUIS U. L.J. 119, 129-30 (1996)

(describing the history of the Dunlop Commission and its investigation of workermanagement relations); William B. Gould, Labor Policy by and Beyond the NLRB:
Globalization, Corporate Reorganization,and the American Workforce, Remarks by NLRB

Chairman William B. Gould to the Commonwealth Club of California (Aug. 4, 1997), in
152 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-1 (Aug. 7, 1997) (summarizing the state of labor relations
in August of 1997); Teamwork for Employees and Management Act of 1997 (TEAM),
S.295, 105th Cong. (1997); As TEAM ACT Moves through Congress, Employers Pursue
Employee Involvesment, EMPLOYEE REL. WKLY. (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at 255 (explaining

Congressional debate regarding labor-management committees); NAM Offers Agenda for
Helping Workers That Stresses Worker Involvement of TEAM, LAB. REL. WK., Mar. 5,

1997, at 229 (stressing that the employee involvement that the TEAM Act would allow is
critical to insuring the competitiveness of U.S. companies); Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking
the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and Labor-Management Cooperation Coexist?, 8

DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159, 185 (1996) (discussing employee participation in workplace
decisions).

See generally CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE
IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION (1988)
(summarizing the origin,

INVOLVEMENT

development and future of labor-management interaction).
90. For a description of employers using the right to implement and the impact that had
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Furthermore, an implementation regime conflicts with H.K Porter v.
NLRB 9' and § 8(d), which forbid the Board to compel a party to make a
bargaining concession or agree to a proposal.
Experience with what
employers choose to do when they have the power to implement means the
Board can predict what such a contract is likely to contain. Such a contract
is very different from one formed where the union was given the power to
impose, where neither party could impose, or where there was interest
arbitration. Employers who can impose terms do not necessarily opt for
lowering labor costs. They opt for more power, and they opt to eliminate
the union. In a study of NLRB cases involving implementation upon
impasse, 50% of employers reached impasse on "control issues," 92 that is,
terms that allow an employer to control the workplace as if its employees
were not represented by a union. Employers opt for using implementation
upon impasse to forestall agreement 3 and, ultimately, exempt themselves
from labor law's requirements to bargain.94 Faced with this doctrine and
their experience of what employers are likely to do, unions feel compelled
to make concessions solely to avoid impasse and implementation.95 The

on the workplace versus a decision to reverse that policy and work with the union to
establish joint governance, see Caryn L. Beck-Dudley & Steven H. Hanks, On Virtue and
Peace: Creatinga Workplace Where People Can Flourish, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427,
435-46 (2003).
91. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
92. Ellen J. Dannin & Terry H. Wagar, Lawless Law?: The Subversion of the National
Labor Relations Act, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 197, 223 tbl. 5 (2000).
93. In TNT Skypak, Inc., the employer withdrew from the tentative agreements it had
reached when it saw the union was about to agree to the employer's proposals and thus
conclude a contract. The employer later told the union it would not agree to any terms
greater than those of its unrepresented employees and that it preferred not having a union.
Finally, the employer withdrew recognition. The course of bargaining in this case extended
over a number of months, during which the union gradually acceded to all the employer's
demands with only a couple of minor exceptions for which it asked for further
consideration. It was at that point that the employer withdrew from its tentative agreements
and made proposals that increased the distance between the parties. It seems likely that the
union was conducting its course of bargaining in response to its assumptions that the
employer was trying to reach an impasse and would eventually implement its final offer,
making capitulation the only viable alternative. 328 N.L.R.B. at 472-75.
94. Some employers have tried to impose standards for wage-setting based on
employer-determined merit. The highly subjective nature of such a term permits the
employer to take unilateral action. See, e.g., Detroit Typographical Union No. 18 v. NLRB,
216 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McClatchey Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026,
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. den., 524 I.S. 937 (1998).
95. However, this may not be a viable strategy. In TruServ Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d
1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 (2002), the D.C. Circuit reversed a
National Labor Relations Board decision that the employer had not reached a genuine
impasse in negotiations with International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 293 before
implementing new work rules. The court held that, in order to avoid impasse, a union had to
have presented a substantial change in its position in response to the company's final offer.
254 F.3d at 1117.
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judicial amendments take away any power a union has to do more than
pursue a course of "incremental concessionism." Implementation upon
impasse thus treads perilously close to prohibitions against compelling
agreements or concessions.
E.

Not UnderstandingImplementation upon Impasse

Although judges created the doctrine of implementation upon impasse
many years ago, a surprising number of labor lawyers fail to take it into
consideration. For example, recent law reform proposals were made: to
make family-related matters a mandatory subject of bargaining; 96 to make
"the relationship between bargaining units and negotiating units a
mandatory subject of bargaining" 97 so that economic weapons could be
used to promote the creation of negotiating units; and to make permanent
replacement of strikers a mandatory subject of bargaining.98 The authors
advocated these proposals assuming that making these matters mandatory
subjects of bargaining would require real bargaining on the issues. The
authors know that black letter law divides bargaining into mandatory and
permissive subjects of bargaining. Wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment are mandatory subjects, while all other legal subjects are
permissive subjects of bargaining. 99 Parties may reach an impasse on and
may strike in support of a mandatory subject of bargaining but may do
neither in the case of a permissive subject of bargaining.'0°
Yet the employer's right to implement means that bargaining is
essentially the same whether or not a subject is mandatory or permissive.
So if a union wants to bargain about childcare provisions and they are a
permissive subject of bargaining, the union and employer are free to reach
agreement on the issue, assuming the employer agrees to bargain. If the
employer refuses to bargain, the union cannot insist and also cannot strike
because it is illegal to strike over a permissive subject. To strike would get
the workers fired. If childcare were instead a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the parties could bargain about the subject and reach an
agreement, if the employer wished. Or the employer could make an offer,
reach impasse, and implement its final offer. The union could strike over
96. Melissa A. Childs, The Changing Face of Unions: What Women Want From
Employers, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 381, 402 (1999-2000) (arguing that "[m]andatory subject
standards should be construed to encompass benefits to accommodate working women's
needs as 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment over which employers must bargain ...").
97. Howard Wial, The Emerging OrganizationalStructure of Unionism in Low-Wage
Services, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 671, 734 (1993).
98. Bierman & Gely, supra note 45, at 366, 388-91.
99. COMMITTEE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 768-75, 1157-1289 (4th ed. 2001).
100. Id. at 773-80, 918-30.
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childcare, and then the employer could permanently replace the strikers.
Or the employer could lock them out and replace them. Even if the
replacements were only temporary, with lockouts lasting three years on
average,01 the workforce would be discharged in all respects that mattered.
In other words, what would be gained by making the issue mandatory?
As to the proposals to make bargaining units a mandatory subject, the
result would be that it gives the employer the ability to unilaterally create
the unit it prefers. In fact, this is essentially what International Paper' °a was
permitted to do by using implementation. There is far more protection for
the union in having unit determination remain a permissive subject of
bargaining that can only be changed by agreement. The same sort of
situation would result from the suggestion to make striker replacement a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The employer could implement whatever
rules it wanted as to permanently
replacing strikers-perhaps resulting in
10 3
less protection than current law.
This does not begin to tap the power implementation bargaining gives
an employer. For example, consider employer decisions as to who will
perform specific work and where. Much has been written on the question
whether employers have an obligation to bargain over decisions to
subcontract, relocate or terminate unit work. 4 It is acknowledged that the
decision to subcontract is a mandatory subject of bargaining, while whether
an employer must bargain over a decision to relocate depends on a
complex,6 subjective multifactor test'0 5 whose results are difficult to
10
predict.
101. LeRoy, supra note 36, at 990, 1027-28.
102. Int'l PaperCo., 115 F.3d at 1047.
103. Bierman and Gely miss the significance of implementation upon impasse when they
suggest the following outcome of a bargaining impasse:
It could be argued that our proposal will not, in practice, produce results any
different than could be accomplished by merely overruling the Mackay doctrine.
That is, under our proposal unions could arguably bargain to impasse over the
striker replacement issue, call a strike, and then behave opportunistically,
because employers will not be allowed to replace economic strikers. We argue
from both a practical and theoretical perspective that a contrary dynamic will
likely prevail.
Bierman & Gely, supra note 45, at 393. They are not alone. See William R. Corbett,
Taking the Employer's Gun and Bargaining About Returning It: A Reply to "A Law,
Economics, and Negotiations Approach " to Striker Replacement Law, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1511, 1519-20, 1524-37 (1995) (addressing Bierman and Gely's arguments).
104. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 11; Zimarowski, supra note 36.
105. Catherine Fayette has found through her analysis of court of appeals decisions on
these issues that appellate judges tend to reverse NLRB decisions ordering employers to
bargain and to do so based on highly subjective bases. See Catherine R. Fayette, Judicial
Decisions on an Employer's Duty to Bargain: Objective Analyses or Personal Biases?
(unpublished article, on file with author).
106. See Jan W. Stumer, An Analysis of the NLRB's "Runaway Shop" Doctrine in the
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The employer who understands the potential of implementation
bargaining would never fight over whether a relocation decision is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. That requires a complex analysis with
difficult evidentiary burdens and an uncertain outcome--except as to huge
lawyers' fees. The wise employer would treat the decision as a mandatory
subject of bargaining, bargain to impasse, and implement the initial
relocation decision. Litigating whether a decision was a mandatory or
permissive subject of bargaining is much more complex and uncertain than
is the question of whether the parties reached a bargaining impasse.
a
Furthermore, by willingly bargaining the employer could well forestall
10 7
charge that the decision was illegal discrimination under § 8(a)(3).
Of course, making a term a mandatory subject of bargaining has some
advantages for unions. Unions have right to notice of employer actions as
to mandatory subjects of bargaining and greater rights to information about
mandatory, as opposed to permissive, subjects of bargaining.'" In many
instances these alone may be valuable rights. As can be seen in the
International Paper situation, however, notice and even bargaining can
satisfy the employer's legal obligations but be of virtually no value to the
employee.
Implementation bargaining can also destroy the fruits of organizing.
An employer who understands these judicial doctrines would not waste
time and money fighting a union organizing drive. Rather, it would agree
to a fast election or, better yet, recognize the union based on a check of
It would agree to immediate
signed union authorization cards.
negotiations, reach a quick impasse, and implement. The union would be
shown up as impotent, and employees would have an object lesson as to
just how useful a union is. The employer could produce ample evidence
that it has no anti-union animus should the union file charges alleging the
employer has not bargained in good faith.
Context of Mid-term Work Relocations Based on Union Labor Costs, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 289 (2000) (considering an employer's potential legal obligations and liabilities if
it decides to relocate union work during the time of the union contract wholly or partly
because of labor costs); see also First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (holding
that an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to close part of its business for
solely economic reasons outweighed the incremental benefit that might be gained from the
union's participation in that decision); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964) (holding that an employer had to bargain collectively with representatives of its
employees before contracting out work previously performed by union members); Dubuque
Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 390-92 (1991), enforced in part, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(enforcing the Board's order against an employer that refused to bargain collectively before
relocating and cutting parts of its operations); NLRB Memorandum GC 84-4, available at
1984 WL 50029 (N.L.R.B.G.C.) (explaining the Board's decision that relocations that don't
modify a specific contract term may still be mandatory subjects of bargaining).
107. Sturner supra note 106, at 294-95.
108. See, e.g., Zimarowski, supra note 36, at 74.
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Finally, implementation bargaining can be very expensive. Don Lee
Distributor, Inc.'°9 demonstrates the range of costs implementation
bargaining can visit on all parties. After a lengthy trial, the employers were
ordered to rescind the changes they had made and make employees whole
for lost wages.110 The employers owed a sum large enough to destroy their
businesses."' The workers lost homes, had marriages broken, and suffered
mental stress during the years the process took. No remedy can bring back
those lost years or repair the emotional and personal costs. Government
and society bore the huge costs of trying and deciding a case in which the
hearing lasted sixty days. Eventually, the employers were forced by the
outcome of the case and other pressures to sign collective bargaining
agreements. At learning this, some employees wept, because they had
12
despaired of ever seeing justice done.'
Bear in mind that this was a happy outcome for the employees. As
bad as all this was, they did not strike, so they were not permanently
replaced. "' They also were not locked out. The union was also able to
hang on as their representative and fight to regain at least some of what was
taken from them. Worse scenarios are played out around the country, with
109. 322 N.L.R.B. 470 (1996), aff'd 145 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1102 (1999). A discussion of the facts of the case can be found at Dannin, Legislative
Intent, supra note 69, at 14-20.
110. 322 N.L.R.B. at 472-74.
111. Telephone interview with Sam McKnight, Attorney in Detroit, Mich. (Feb. 6,
2002). In June 1998, when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming
the violation, the union attorney estimated back pay to be at least $40 million. Terry
Kosdrosky, Beer DistributorsLose Back-pay Ruling Appeal, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., June 8,
1998, at 22; see also Beer Distributors Found to Bargain in Bad Faith With Detroit IBT
Local, 241 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D13 (Dec. 19, 1994).
112. The back pay accrued over more than ten years with accumulated interest for
approximately 450 employees. Some lost $17,000 a year as a result of the employers'
implemented pay cuts, plus amounts owed employees for cuts in pensions, vacations,
holidays, and other employee compensation. As of February 2002, only two of the six
employers had paid any back pay. This means that more than ten years after the unfair labor
practices were committed, $27 million of the $45 million in back pay was still owed.
Telephone interview with Sam McKnight, supra note 111.
113. Studies of the employer's ability to permanently replace economic strikers
demonstrate that it does affect collective bargaining. If workers can strike and forego their
pay but not lose their jobs, then they are more likely to be willing to use this economic
weapon than if striking risks losing a job. The evidence thus suggests that allowing
permanent replacement greatly weakens union bargaining power. See, e.g., PETER
RACHLEFF, HARD-PRESSED IN THE HEARTLAND: THE HORMEL STRIKE AND THE FUTURE OF
THE LABOR MOVEMENT 13-14 (1993); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE
FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 111-12 (1990); Cynthia L. Gramm, Empirical

Evidence on PoliticalArguments Relating to Replacement Worker Legislation, 42 LAB. L.J.
491 (1991). Unions have responded by developing alternate strategies, such as corporate
campaigns, to assert pressure on the employer. MICHAEL YATES, POWER ON THE JOB: THE
LEGAL RIGHTS OF WORKING PEOPLE 113 (1994). However, these appear to be far less

effective than would be the strike weapon.
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14
most never being widely noticed.'

F.

Putting Implementation, Lockout, and Striker Replacement Together

Implementation upon impasse, lockout, and striker replacement are
each powerful tools that judges have created, despite their violating the
most fundamental structures of the NLRA. When used together, their
synergistic operation guts the NLRA. Indeed, this is the way they must be
understood, because all these doctrines are connected with reaching a
bargaining impasse and thus likely to occur together. They can be
connected as part of a strategy to de-unionize and defeat the purposes of the
NLRA.
To see how this works, think of the impact of these doctrines as
creating a branching tree of possible outcomes, including, in part: (1) the
parties reach an agreement; (2) the parties reach an impasse but eventually
resolve their differences; (3) the parties reach an impasse, the employer
implements its final offer, and the parties then reach an agreement; (4) the
parties reach an impasse, the employer implements its final offer, the
parties then fail to reach an agreement, and the union becomes moribund
leading to de-unionization---either by its walking away or through
decertification;115 (5) the parties reach an impasse, the workers strike, the
employer replaces the strikers (permanently or temporarily), the parties
reach an agreement on workplace terms and on striker reinstatement, and
many or all strikers are recalled to work; (6) the parties reach an impasse,
114. Consider just a few recent notorious and protracted disputes: Caterpillar, Inc., 324
N.L.R.B. 201 (1997) (concerning a dispute over the removal of a union's health and safety
fliers); The Detroit News, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 262 (1997) (concerning a dispute between a
newspaper and a union over added responsibilities under which journalists were ordered to
appear on television); Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.R.B. 78 (1992)
(concerning the 1987 strike by the National Football League's professional players);
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995)
(concerning a dispute over the contract status of professional baseball players); AMERICAN
DREAM (Barbara Kopple 1990); RACHLEFF supra note 113 (concerning the Hormel strike);
Int'l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1995) (concerning a dispute that arose when an
employer subcontracted replacement workers on a permanent basis). See also JULIUS
GERMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14 (1998) (providing a case study of one protracted
dispute).
115. When § 9(c)(3) was enacted in 1947, it completely barred all replaced economic
strikers from voting in a union decertification election. The law was amended in 1959 to
permit replaced economic strikers to vote in a union decertification election within one year
of the beginning of a strike. LeRoy concludes that employers prolong replacement strikes
beyond the first anniversary of a strike's inception so that the strikers are ineligible to vote
in a union decertification election. LeRoy, supra note 76, at 1028-42. As a Board attorney,
I observed that unions reacted by having strikers file RD petitions to decertify the union so
that the election would be held at a time when the strikers would be eligible to vote, thus
preserving the union's right to represent the unit for one more year.
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the workers strike, the employer replaces the strikers (permanently or
temporarily), the parties reach an agreement on workplace terms and on
striker reinstatement, few or no strikers are recalled to work, and the union
eventually becomes moribund and is decertified; (7) the parties reach an
impasse, the workers strike, the employer replaces the strikers permanently,
and after one year, when they are ineligible to vote, a decertification
election is held and the union is decertified; (8) the parties reach an
impasse, the employer locks out the workers and then replaces them
(permanently or temporarily), the parties reach an agreement on workplace
terms and on reinstatement, and many or all the employees are recalled to
work; (9) the parties reach an impasse, the employer locks out and replaces
the workers (permanently or temporarily), the parties reach an agreement
on workplace terms and on reinstatement, few or no employees are recalled
16
to work, and the union eventually becomes moribund and is decertified.'
Other outcomes are possible, some of which lead to agreement, some
of which lead to disempowering the union, and some of which lead to the
end of collective bargaining."' This is not NLRA bargaining. This is a
laundry list of judicial amendments that undercut fundamental NLRA goals
of worker self-representation and workplace co-determination and that
destroy equality of bargaining power and collective bargaining. While not
all employers will use these judicial amendments to the fullest, they
provide an employer, who harbors anti-union attitudes, (and employer
resistance to unions is widespread)' 8 control of whether its employees can
116. See Peter Bruce, On the Status of Workers' Rights to Organize in the United States
and Canada, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW supra note 74, at 273
(noting the destructive power of an employer's refusal to bargain coupled with an
employer's ability to replace striking workers). In recent years, judicial decisions have
limited striker rights to reinstatement. Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the
Strike Replacement Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 363, 381-99 (1992) (describing the erosion of
replaced strikers' reinstatement rights). The documentary AMERICAN DREAM amply
illustrates the problem. AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 114.
117. For example, in alternative (4) above, another likely scenario is sketched by James
Brudney:
In legal terms, it is possible for a union to let a collective bargaining agreement
expire, refuse to accede to management's concessionary demands, and continue
to work without a contract while initiating at least some of the tactical
approaches developed by the Jay strikers. But Getman points out that under the
law, International Paper could have unilaterally implemented its proposal,
imposing lost holidays, job classification changes, and the elimination of some
300 jobs through subcontracting. Those lawful moves would likely anger
members enough to force a strike.
James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 65, 85-86 (reviewing
JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS AND PERMANENT
REPLACEMENTS (1998)).

118. See generally Morris Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding
the Decline of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519 (2001) (analyzing the
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exercise rights the statute says they have. For an anti-union employer,
impasse becomes a goal rather than a glitch on the way to a negotiated
agreement.) 9 As long as the law makes impasse a potential goal, then we
must always wonder whether the parties reached an impasse because they
simply could not agree, or whether the impasse is the result of a strategy
designed to subvert the right of workers to bargain collectively through a
union they have designated.
G.

Understandingthe Impact of Implementation, Lockout, and Striker
Replacement

Law and the social sciences offer a number of ways to grapple with
how the judicial impasse doctrines have altered NLRA bargaining,
including experimental economic methodology, contract theory, and social
science data.
1.

Seeing the Impasse Doctrines Through the Lens of Experimental
Economic Methodology

Experimental economics provide a framework for gaining a deeper
understanding of how the impasse doctrines transform NLRA bargaining
from an ultimatum game into a dictator game. First, the employer's ability
to implement its final offer upon impasse is a form of dictator game,
because it allows player one (the employer) to propose a division of
resources that the law gives player two (the union) no ability to reject.
Experiments confirm economic theory that a dictator game will lead to
player one offering nothing to player two. 20 To the extent that this
captures core elements of implementation bargaining, it suggests that
employer offers under such a system will be far lower than under
ultimatum game/NLRA bargaining.
It remains to be seen whether
empirical studies will confirm this difference.' 2 '
management resistance to unionization and its costs and incentives).
119. See, e.g., Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting that a company did not contest the NLRB's conclusion that it violated the NLRA by
engaging in "deliberate and egregious bad faith conduct aimed at frustrating the bargaining
process").
120. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 1, at 270.
121. Some data suggest that the use of implementation upon impasse lowers union
ability to achieve first contracts. See, e.g., Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in
Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW supra note 74, at 75, 84, 86; see also ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW
RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES

(Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998); Joel Cutcher-

Gernshenfeld et al., How Do Labor and Management View Collective Bargaining?,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23, 23 (Oct. 1998); Aided by Consultants, Employers Are Blatantly
Violating Law, Saporta Says, 36 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-3 (Feb. 22, 1985).
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As discussed above, the employer's right to replace strikers is akin to
an ultimatum game with punishment, but without the normal assignment of
the right to punish. Economic experiments have repeatedly falsified the
economic theory that the first player will offer a minimal amount to the
second player and that the rational second player will accept anything more
than zero. 1 2 Player one commonly offers substantially more than the
minimum amount and often splits the sum, and player two tends to be
willing to punish unfair divisions, that is divisions not approaching an even
division. When there is an ability to punish a non-cooperating (or nongenerous) proposer, proposing players tend to make more even offers.1 23 In
short, proposers are more generous in the ultimatum game than in the
dictator game. 124 If these insights are correct, then NLRA collective
bargaining in which the strike weapon is intact should lead to improved
wages and working conditions for employees, just as the Act intended.
The judicial amendments mean the strike weapon is not intact. While
the union can strike and thus inflict punishment if it does not like the
employer's offer, the employer (player one) can inflict even greater
punishment on the union (player two) by permanently replacing all the
strikers. This should negate the ability of the union (player two) to inflict
any punishment. This reordering of an ultimatum game's structure ought
to reinforce the employer's "dictator" power and skew offers toward the
employer's preferences.
Even more destructive of the NLRA's goal is that the judicial
amendments have changed the normal assignment of punishment from the
one trying to enforce cooperation to the one who does not want to
cooperate. In other words, this system essentially lets the employer define
what level of cooperation it is willing to engage in, if any, and to mete out
punishment if it decides the union has not "cooperated." As a result, by
giving the employer the power to implement its final offer and to use
striker replacement and lockout with displacement, the judicial impasse
doctrines displace collective bargaining with a dictator game. Under such a
system, a union will have no power to resist employer unilateralism.
2.

Contract Theory and the Judicial Impasse Doctrines

To return to contract theory, imagine, that when a seller walked away
from negotiations at impasse, the buyer had the right to permanently
replace any or all of the seller's personnel with those it found more
tractable and thus more likely to agree to the buyer's terms. In this system,
walking away would risk organizational suicide or, at least, a brain
122. Ostrom, supra, note 4, at 11-12.
123. Id. at 7-8.

124. Roth, supra note 1, at 270.
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transplant. Indeed, the buyer would hope for the seller's exit, because it
could then "colonize" the seller and control it. In the collective bargaining
context, this means that the wall the NLRA maintains between employer
and employee domains is breached because judges give an employer the
right to replace strikers, a/k/a union members, with nonunion workers. If
striking is the exercise of worker voice to inform the employer of worker
preferences, striker replacement allows an employer to transform the nature
of a strike from voice to exit.
Or, imagine that if the buyer itself walked away this would give the
buyer the right to temporarily replace the seller's personnel. In other
words, the price for a seller's refusal to agree to anything the buyer offered
would be for the buyer to walk away from the negotiations and also have
the right to replace the seller's personnel with those who will follow
wherever the buyer leads. That would be the current situation with
lockouts in collective bargaining.2 5 Even without the right to permanently
displace locked out employees, the average locked out employee can
expect to be out of work over a thousand days.126 While they are locked
out of their jobs, the employer can impose whatever terms it wants, de facto
decertifying the union for however long the lockout lasts. Under those
circumstances, the right to permanently replace locked out workers can
hardly do more to undermine union bargaining power and NLRA collective
bargaining.
3.

Do the Judicial Impasse Doctrines Matter?

Experimental economics and contract theory are useful in
understanding the impact of the judicial impasse doctrines, but they cannot
tell the whole story of how the judicial impasse doctrines actually affect
collective bargaining. Of course, neither does looking at labor law from a
purely doctrinal viewpoint. It is far too impoverished to explain the reality
of a law, such as labor law, that is inextricably imbedded in and affected by
its social and economic contexts.
We need to consider what else affects collective bargaining. Any
method of impasse resolution affects bargaining power and rewards certain
party behavior. The NLRA itself recognizes that law caused an imbalance
in bargaining power by allowing one bargaining partner, the employer, to
125. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v NLRB, 858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Ancor Concepts, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 742 (1997); Goldsmith Motors Corp., 310
N.L.R.B. 1279 (1993); Harter Equip., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986), aff'd sub nom.; Operating
Eng'rs Local 825 v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458; see also, Int'l Paper Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that employer's permanently subcontracting unit work during a
lockout produced too minimal an effect to place the company's conduct in the inherently
destructive category).
126. LeRoy, supra note 36, at 990, 1027-28.
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law, while the other, the employee,
become collective through corporation
127
could only bargain as an individual.
But while law is certainly an important force, it is not the only one.1 28
If it were, all employers would recognize that the judicial amendments
gave them the power to act unilaterally and would do nothing other than
reach impasse, implement their final offers, and permanently replace any
strikers. Although there are no data on the frequency with which these
things happen, we know this is not what happens all of the time.
Something else other than law must matter.
Although there is essentially no research about these issues, we can
speculate that certain specific factors affect whether the judicial impasse
doctrines are used to their full potential. 29 For example, some employers
will value the process of collective bargaining or respect their employees'
right to choose a representative or not want to endure the disruption created
by impasse, implementation, strikes, or strike replacement. In other cases,
unions will be able to muster potent resources, such as strong community
support, high employee commitment, low unemployment, or strong
demand for the employer's goods or services so that the union has
sufficient power to bargain as an equal. 130 This does not mean that law
makes no difference. In every case, the judicial impasse amendments place
a thumb on the employer's side of the scale to lower the union's power a
notch or two from what it would have been otherwise.' 31
Looked at from more of an institutionalist perspective, the state of
NLRA bargaining we have today severely constrains the union's power by
making it difficult to impose a cost on the employer for not complying with
the union's wishes. 112 This is not to say that unions can never win a strike
today. Rather, holding all social and economic factors equal, a union will
have a much more difficult task in every situation. As the state of the

127. 29 U.S.C. § 151. For an empirical study of the impact of different collective
bargaining laws, see Dannin & Singh, The Force of Law, supra note 75.
128. Law plays a role that "substantially affects union organizing and collective
bargaining." Gregory Saltzman, Higher Education Collective Bargaining and the Law, in
NEA ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2001).

129. These ideas were developed with D. Gangaram Singh as part of our empirical
research into implementation upon impasse.
130. Unions have few weapons to recreate NLRA bargaining power. Rather than pursue
the tactic of making successive small concessions, one union reached an agreement with an
employer that the contract provisions remain in effect "until a conclusion is reached in the
matter of proposed changes." Of course, most unions, and in particular a union with
depleted bargaining power facing a strong and determined employer, would be unlikely to
achieve such an agreement, especially if the employer realized its potential loss of the right
to implement upon reaching impasse. Pioneer Elec. of Monroe, Inc. & Pioneer Elec. &
Mech. Contractor, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 1192, 1193 (2001).
131. Dannin & Singh, The Force of Law, supra note 75.
132. Cf. James B. Zimarowski, supra note 36, at 67-68.
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economy worsens, and, in particular, as unemployment increases, unions
reach a point where a strike is of no value. This point is reached under less
adverse conditions than would have been the situation before these judicial
amendments.
What is easy to ignore is that other government policies promote an
environment that deprives unions of social and economic resources they
need to overcome the impact of the judicial impasse amendments on
bargaining power. Chief among these has been the Federal Reserve's
policy to fight inflation by raising interest rates whenever unemployment
falls too low 3 3 and government deregulation. Both have led to higher
unemployment. 3 4 When unemployment is high, striker replacement
becomes a greater threat, and those fortunate enough to have a job feel
grateful to have any job under any conditions. In these circumstances, a
union that can do no more as a bargaining representative than stave off
impasse and implementation and persuade workers not to strike for fear of
being replaced is a union that has little to offer its members and nothing to
attract potential new members. It is also a union that is unable to achieve
the NLRA's goals of increasing "the purchasing power of wage earners"
and stabilizing "competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries.' 3 5
This means that the employer's ability to implement its final offer at
impasse and to leverage that ability to de-unionize may also help explain
the lack of union organizing success. 136 Anti-union campaigns frequently
133.

The Wages Of FearAnd The New Workplace, AUSTL. FIN. REV. 32 (Mar. 21, 2001)

(asserting that inflation fighting policies increase unemployment, lower job security, and
disempower workers vis a vis their employers); Stuart Silverstein, Some Economists
Question Link Between Wages and Inflation; Labor: Pay Raises Get a Bad Rap on Wall
Street, but Critics Contend That Higher Salaries Might Energize Economy. Core of Debate
Is "Natural Rate of Unemployment." L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at C-I; Sylvia Nasar,

Thinking as the Fed Thinks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at D-1; see also Gary H. Stem,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The (Uncertain) Resilience of the U.S.
Economy, The 12th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on Financial Markets (Apr. 25,
2002) available at http://minneapolisfed.org/news/pres/stem0402.cfm (discussing the
difficulties in predicting the performance of the U.S. economy); David Altig & Paul
Gomme, In Search of the NAIRU, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic
Commentary (May 1, 1998), available at http://www.clev.frb.org/research/com98/#0501
(defining the "nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment" (NAIRU) and identifying
the factors economists consider in describing its relationship to the unemployment rate).
In the 1980s that context included economic policy driven by a desire to stamp out
inflation, government policies that led to high unemployment, pressures for low product
prices-plus labor laws that gave management many ways to escape or avoid collective
bargaining. CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 73, at 8. See also other

essays in the same volume describing trends affecting collective bargaining in a wide array
of industries.
134. CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 73, at 8.

135. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
136. As labor's numbers decline, it loses power and becomes less attractive to workers in
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inform employees of failed strikes and ineffective unions,'37 situations that
can result from the use of impasse and implementation coupled with striker
replacement. In other words, to the extent that de-unionization and
declining union density lead to lower union bargaining power, they make
unions less attractive to workers and make organizing more difficult. This
in turn contributes to lower union bargaining power.
Current bargaining and economic theory are now insufficiently robust
to answer many common questions. Scholars are puzzled as to why union
density continues to decline, 131 why wages and other working conditions
did not improve during an extended time of low unemployment,3 9 and
many ways. Nelson Lichtenstein offers an overview of reasons advanced for labor's decline
in recent decades. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN
LABOR 212-45 (2002).
137. MARTIN LEVITT & TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER (1993).
Anti-union films employers show during organizing campaigns play up these issues. See,
e.g., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-THE PARTY'S OVER (n.d., film on file with author); UNION
STRIKES-A LOT ON THE LINE (n.d., film on file with author).
138. See Leroy D. Clark, Movements in Crisis: Employee-Owned Businesses-A
Strategy for Coalition Between Unions and Civil Rights Organizations, 46 How. L.J. 49,
57-59 (2002) (comparing similarities between labor unions and civil rights organizations
and proposing a coalition based on the development of worker owned businesses); CutcherGernshenfeld, How Do Labor and Management View Collective Bargaining?, supra note
121, at 23 (providing a summary of the state of collective bargaining in the United States);
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1529-30 (2002) (discussing ineffectiveness of American labor law because of its
ossification); Estlund, Economic Rationality, supra note 11, at 925-26, 930-34, 947-49
(discussing economic impact of employer resistance to unions); Daniel J. B. Mitchell, A
Decade of Concession Bargaining, in LABOR ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 435, 440 (Clark Kerr & Paul D. Staudohar eds., 1994); Leo
Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to Paul Weiler, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
681, 682 (1992) (asserting that natural market forces explain the deunionization trend).
Paula Voos mentions reasons often cited for union decline: changing locus of jobs,
job composition, management resistance to unions, and union organizing efforts. Voos
herself sees as key factors an environment that encouraged competition based on low wages
and laws that gave employers wide latitude to escape bargaining. Voos, supra note 73, at
14. Some variation occurs based on whether only private sector or public and private sector
union members are included. See MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER 107 (1998)
(discussing minority workers' inroads into the private sector); Richard B. Freeman & Joel
Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13 (Bruce E.
Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (discussing factors in the private sector); see also
Gary N. Chaison & Joseph B. Rose, The Macrodeterminantsof Union Growth and Decline,
in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 3 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991) (discussing research
explaining union growth and decline).
139. For a review of current research on the economic situation for workers and factors
lowering bargaining power, see Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing (Sept. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.ustdrc.gov/ research/bronfenbrenner.pdf. For charts showing changes in wages,
see generally HOLLY SKLAR ET AL., RAISE THE FLOOR: WAGES AND POLICIES THAT WORK
FOR ALL OF US (2001); CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 73; Paul
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whether law reform can change these outcomes. 4 In other words, one
reason analysts are at a loss to explain this aspect of the economy is that
they have failed to take into account part of the explanation.
II. How Do JUDGES Go WRONG AND How CAN THEY Go RIGHT?
Understanding the processes that have allowed judge-made law to
rewrite the NLRA so dramatically is more than an academic exercise and
more than a question of enforcing Congress' express policies. There is
widespread and growing discontent with the NLRA. Union representative
41
Wade Rathke accuses the NLRB of being "complicit with employers."'
Larry Cohen, Communication Workers of America (CWA) President,
advocates that unions have a national day of civil disobedience to shut
down every NLRB office across the country. "Labor needs to show the
public that the NLRB is broken," he said. 14 Union critics point to NLRB
election delay, laws that cripple unions, striker replacement, and remedies
that are so weak as to be useless, to name only a few. 1 43 Some have even
argued that they would be better off with the law of the jungle or no law
compared to the NLRA. 44
Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directionsfor the Law of the Workplace, 102 YALE L.J. 1907,
1908-10 (1993); see also Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality:
The United States vs. Other Advanced Countries, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULEs 29
(Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994) (discussing factors of the labor market contributing to the
rise in wage inequality in the 1980s). Stephen Kropp suggests that the increase in consumer
bankruptcy is a direct result of the decline of income that has resulted from decreasing union
power. Steven H. Kropp, The Safety Valve Status of Consumer Bankruptcy Law: The
Decline of Unions as a Partial Explanation for the Dramatic Increase in Consumer
Bankruptcies, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (1999). He argues that they reduce "political
pressure to narrow the economic gap in America, a task unions previously performed in our
society." Id. at 5. In addition they make it possible for underpaid workers to have a higher
standard of living than would otherwise be possible. Id. at 4.
140. See, e.g., Willard Wirtz, Labor Unions: Not Well but Alive, 69 CHi.-KENT. L. REV.
259 (1993).
141. Wade Rathke, Majority Unionism: Strategies for Organizing the 21' Century Labor
Movement (June 2002) (unpublished paper, on file with author). See also Barbara
Ehrenreich & Thomas Geoghegan, Lighting Labor'sFire, THE NATION (Dec. 23, 2002).
142. Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO Convenes Organizing Summit to Find New Ways to
Expand Membership, 9 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at C-I (Jan. 14, 2003).
143. For examples of this discussion, see Labor Notes Roundtable, Organizing: What's
Needed (Nov. 2002 - Apr. 2003), availableat http://www.labornotes.org/archives/2003
/organizing.html.
144. Labor leaders such as Richard Trumka and Lane Kirkland have even called for the
repeal of the NLRA and a return to common law. Richard Trumka, Why Labor Law Has
Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 871, 881 (1987); Richard Trumka, Build Rank-and-File
Activism, in THE FuTuRE OF LABOR 64 (Labor Research Association 1992); Kirkland Calls
for Excluding Employers From Election Process, 116 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D8 (June
18, 1993); Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding NLRB, Calls Board an "Impediment" to
Organizing. 167 Dailv Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-II (Aug. 30, 1989); Senate Labor
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The sad thing is that these critics are attacking the wrong target. The
problem lies not so much with the NLRA's language as with those who
interpret and apply the law. Missing this point means wasting energy
trying to replace a law with sound fundamentals. It also means ignoring the
danger that any law will suffer the same fate as a result of judicial
amendment. Therefore, at best, new legislation can be of no more than
temporary help. In both the long and short run, the only thing that can
restore collective bargaining rights is persuading judges to reverse course
and enforce the NLRA's express language and policies.
A.

How Do Judges Rewrite Labor Law?

Advocating that judges begin dismantling the judicial amendments is
no easy thing. One obvious problem is that doctrines, such as striker
replacement, that have been approved by the Supreme Court cannot be
easily reversed. But the more general problem may be even more
intractable. It would be easy to write off judges as conservatives who are
merely pursuing a conservative course of decision making based on their
class interests. While there may be some evidence of this, 145 it alone is
insufficient and too unsubtle to explain
the complex processes that led to
46
the judicial impasse amendments.
Among the factors that have contributed to the judicial amendments
include judges' lack of understanding of labor law, a deficiency grounded
in their common law training. In addition, there is the common law mode
of incremental decision making. Finally, the NLRA's drafters themselves
created some of the problems by leaving gaps in the law.
1. The Influence of Common Law
Judges come to the bench imbued with the common law as a body of
law and as a process. As a result, they are less able to understand and be
sympathetic at a deep level with legal regimes that operate contrary to the
laws with which they are familiar. 147 This is a complex topic that could
Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Organizing Rights Under Taft-Hartley Act, 20 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), at A-1I (Feb. 1, 1988).
145. James J. Brudney, Judicial Hostility Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Science Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999)
(presenting a judicial bias study).
146. The ideas here are the subject of a book the author is working on currently: Taking
Back the Workers' Law: A Litigation Strategy for Labor Law Reform Now (unpublished
draft, on file with author).
147. See James Brudney et al., Of Labor Law and Dissonance, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1353
(1998); Julius Getman, Of Labor Law and Birdsong, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1345 (1998);
Dannin, Collective Bargaining, supra note 69; see also Brudney, Judicial Hostility, supra
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itself be the subject of a lengthy study. 48 However, two common law
doctrines in particular make it difficult for judges to sympathize with the
goals and methods of collective bargaining: employer property rights and
master and servant.
In addition, decisions often speak of an employer as "he" rather than
"it" even when the employer is a corporation. This suggests that when they
are deciding a case, judges have a vision of an employer as an individual,
one who is subject to very personal feelings. This imagery has important
implications for how these two common law concepts play out in labor law.
When judges see an employer as a "he" rather than an "it," judges are
more likely to conceive of employment as the employer's property and thus
to ascribe to a job all the body of rights and duties they would give to the
employer's hat. The reality is that most employers under the NLRB's
jurisdiction are likely to be in some ownership form other than a sole
proprietorship. In the case of large corporations, ownership will be diverse
and impersonal, and company actions may be decided by directors,
managers, and officers whose tenure with the company is likely to be short
as they further their careers by moving from one position to another. Never
considered is the fact that the employees are more likely to have long
tenure and enormous personal resources invested in their jobs, as a sort of
sweat equity.
Some are likely to object that the workplace, after all, belongs to the
employer, and when collective bargaining fails, the employer must have the
right to control the workplace terms. 149 Any other solution would be
tantamount to a taking of the employer's property without due process.
Some will respond by saying: Why assume that only the employer owns
the workplace and has the right to control what occurs there? Is there any
reason that the workers have no ownership interests as a result of "sweat
equity"? And if we see only the employer as the owner are we not
overlooking the generous subsidies society provides employers: roads,
sewers, utilities, educated workers, police protection, laws (especially
corporate law), the court system, tax benefits and incentives, and
sometimes outright handouts? Is a society that provides these generous
benefits to employers barred from having some degree of control over
whether that employer runs its business in the public interest?
Envisioning employment as employer property and the employer as an

note 145, at 1675. In a study of a campaign to alter society-wide understandings as a
precursor to labor law reform, it was found that one of the few groups who was not
influenced was the judiciary. Ellen Dannin, Hail, Market, Full of Grace: Buying and Selling
Labor Law Reform, 2001 L.REV. MICH. ST. U. - DET. COLL. L. 1090.
148. For such a study, see generally JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983).
149. Klare, supra note 2, at 11.
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individual makes it more likely to see the employer as having a sense of
responsibility toward the job. This also means that judges are likely to try
to fit employees into this scheme as being present as trespassers or invitees
or some other property concept that allows non-owners to be present. It is
possible that the common law could expand to find in property law some
more accurate place for employees, such as having an easement or rights by
adverse possession. In any case, conceiving of employment as the
possession of a human employer fails to understand the complex nature of
who now is an employer and the importance of jobs in the lives of those
who fill them. It is this mindset that leads to a decision such as
50
Lechmere.1

Master and servant law, even by its very terminology, harkens back 151
to
a day in which there was a human master who had control of servants.
This was a fairly accurate description of the United States through the midnineteenth century when virtually all employees were in bonded servitude
and when the workplace was also likely to be the home. In that day, the
father was also the employer, and the employee was likely to be a blood
child or a child apprentice living in the home. Law developed in this
context of intermingled personal and business relations, where adults
needed to educate and control the children who worked for them, while
also under their care, cannot be comfortably applied to a world in which it
is illegal for children to work, almost no remunerative work is done in the
home, and employment relations are the impersonal ones of a distant
multinational corporation to its employees.
Although it does not speak in these terms, the NLRA understands that
employees have an emotional and physical investment in their jobs that the
law must recognize, protect, and support. Senator Robert Wagner said that
the labor law converted the relation of master and servant into an equal and
co-operative partnership that planted a sense of power, individuality,
freedom and security
in the hearts of men and made them the people they
52
were meant to be.
What these visions of property and master and servant law and the
personal nature of employment lead to is a tendency to interpret labor law
so that the wise and mature employer who has a stake in protecting his
property will go through the process required by law to discuss workplace
issues with his employees. These conceptualizations presume that the
employees are likely to be unwise and immature. Therefore, the employer
is permitted to impose his will when the employees will not see reason.
150. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (limiting the definition of "employee" and
thereby circumscribing workers' rights). See infra discussion Part I.A.
151. Klare, supra note2, at 13.
152. 75 CONG. REc. 4918, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) (speaking of attempts to legislate
organizational right prior to the NLRA).
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And if they are so irresponsible as to leave the workplace, he can react by
taking back his jobs because they have shown so little gratitude for them
and giving them to those who will treat his property with greater care.
Labor law is*not the only area that has to deal with this problem of
societal changes leading to clashes between common law tradition and
legal and social reality. In some cases, such changes can be "integral-and
'
usefully vital-to the evolution of the common law."153
However, the clash
is dangerous when these hidden biases are left unexplored and when judges
are not candid about what is affecting their reasoning processes.
What judges can aspire to is that these moments will result in
decisions that are fully reasoned, that are candid in acknowledging the
tensions that exist in the current status of the common law, and that reflect
a willingness to update the common law on the basis of new information
about the world. In these contexts, judges must hold thoughts tentatively,
be careful to ponder the empirical foundations of the various choices before
them, and-perhaps most importantly-be willing to revisit15 and
abandon
4
prior decisions, if necessary, to forge a sensible path forward.
Unfortunately, this wise path is not the one taken in the case of the
judicial amendments to the NLRA.
2. Incrementalism
Incrementalism is intrinsic to the nature of the common law. The
International Paper case is an example of that process. While
incrementalism suggests slow growth, that does not mean that it cannot
achieve radical results. Glaciers are also slow moving, but they can grind
down mountains and create the Great Lakes. In InternationalPaper,the
court reached an extraordinary result contrary to express provisions of the
NLRA when it applied law that had gradually developed and expanded it to
discrete aspects of the case.
The judicial impasse amendments all show evidence of incrementalist
processes. Striker replacement developed virtually as an afterthought to
Mackay Radio.'55 In the case itself, it was clearly dictum and of no legal
import whatsoever;
but once the Mackay dictum was uttered, it took on a
156
life of its own. Implementation upon impasse was similar 5 7 In 1940, the
NLRB permitted an employer to unilaterally implement its wage offer so it
153. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations,27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 514 (2002).
154. Id. at514-15.
155. 304 U.S. 33. Mackay is also an example of applying common law ideas of property
rights and master and servant.
156. See Finkin, supra note 34 (describing how the Mackay dictum "became a rule").
157. For a history of the development of the implementation upon impasse doctrine, see
Dannin, Legislative Intent, supranote 69; Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 69.
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could comply with new wage and hour laws, but only after lengthy
negotiations had led to an impasse in bargaining that otherwise would have
left the employer in violation of the law. 5 8 Over time the doctrine gradually
expanded and the safeguards were altered so that it became easier to find
that an impasse existed and to allow implementation. 59 The expansion of
lockout law likewise followed a similar course." 6
If judges become too wedded to previous judicial conceptions of
reality, they may resist accepting different conceptions that have evolved in
a dynamic marketplace. Instead of shaping a common law that fits the
circumstances ... as they exist here and now, judges may be tempted to
adhere to precedent rigidly, lest they be seen as engaged in unprincipled
(and somewhat daunting) acts of lawmaking. 161
In the case of labor law, judges adhered to prior concepts and
imported them into the NLRA with the result that they then adjudicated
without sensitivity to the purposes of the NLRA; judges thus engaged in
law making.
Once on this path, incrementalism caused them to veer ever farther
from anything that can be called enforcing the law, but the incrementalist
process blinds them to just how great a detour has been taken.
Incrementalism provides a sense of tradition and almost scientific precision
but can lead to absurd ends that necessitate a return to the core of the law.
We have certainly reached that point with the judicial amendments.
3. The Role of Judges
But perhaps there is something positive to be said for the way judges
have reacted to the NLRA. In some common law countries, New Zealand,
for example, some have stated that judges exist in partnership with the
legislature and that judges are charged with doing justice. 62 Indeed, some
conservative legal philosophers argue that courts, as common law bodies,
should not defer to legislative intent when the court thinks that is
appropriate, for example, when the court concludes that the law is
inconsistent with a society's current mores . 1636 Some would argue that
158. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 630 (1940).
159. Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 69.
160. See cases discussed infra notes 55-56.
161. Strine, supra note 153, at 500.
162. See Margaret Wilson, Policy, Law and the Courts: An Analysis of Recent
Employment Law Cases in New Zealand, 8 AusTL. J. LAB. L. 203, 216-17 (1995)
(discussing the relationship between lawmakers and the courts in New Zealand).
163. See, e.g.,

GUIDO CALABRESI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

2, 18, 24,

121 (1982); Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth
Century, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 36, 44 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1991); Allan Hutchinson &
Derek Morgan, CalabresianSunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1752, 1767
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judges must resolve disputes based on public values, 64 rather than
legislative purpose. One commentator observes that in doing this the
courts are exercising judicial quality control by protecting citizens
"against"66the legislative purpose. 165
We live in a time in which unions regularly win fewer NLRB
elections than they lose, and in which unions are often seen in negative
terms. Arguments for greater judicial activism in overriding legislative
purpose would suggest then that the judicial amendments are an
appropriate response to general social mores.
Yet the history of the judicial amendment process and public views
does not support this argument. MacKay and the early decisions related to
implementation upon impasse all came at a time when unions were more
generally popular. Indeed, it may be that, rather than responding to social
views, the judicial impasse amendments are in part responsible for creating
those mores by undermining unions and deflating the positive public role
they could play. In that case, the judicial impasse amendments can find no
support from the proponents for judicial activism.
Another view is that by giving a conservative interpretation based in
the pre-legislated system, the courts force the legislature to affirm that it
166
intends to take a radical step and repudiate the prior law. This is
appropriate when a court deals with an ambiguous statute. 167 However, in
the case of the judicial impasse doctrines, Congress made it clear that its
intention was to overturn prior law and even that it was acting to remedy
problems created by prior law. Judicial interpretations nonetheless defied
that mandate.
4. Gaps as Minefields
On the other hand, there are strong arguments that the drafters of the
NLRA brought this problem upon themselves. They held extensive
hearings and went through many draft bills. Despite that they failed to
include anything in the legislation about events they had to know were
likely to arise: how to deal with impasses and how to deal with strikers. It
is hard to believe, given what has happened, but the drafters consciously
chose not to regulate how impasses would be resolved; rather, they left this
to the parties to work out, subject solely to the pressures of the market.
(1982) (book review).
164. Wilson, supra note 162, at 217.
165. J. F. Burrows, An Update on Statutory Interpretation,1989 N.Z.L.J. 94, 95; see also
Strine, supra note 153, at 500 (discussing the role of judges in maintaining the legitimacy of
the law and helping it evolve in a dynamic market place).
166. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 114-15 (1990).
167. Id. at 119: CALABRESI, supra note 163, at 4.
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Had the original bill been enacted, the NLRA today would provide for
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. During hearings on the bill, it was
argued that the legislation must remedy "the matter of bringing collective
bargaining negotiations to a conclusion." 168 Instead, today, the NLRA does
not permit the NLRB to engage in conciliation and mediation.169 Rather
than assist in resolving impasses, the NLRA opted for a system that would
give "the reality of opportunity ... to labor to bargain collectively."17
Given the NLRA's goal of promoting collective bargaining, it seems
surprising that its drafters decided to leave bargaining almost unregulated 7 '
and not even require that the Act's goals as to collective bargaining be met,
but this is exactly what they did. 7 2 Indeed, so confident were they that the
parties could resolve problems without any intervention that bad faith
bargaining came close to not even being included as an unfair labor
practice. It was late in the process that bad faith bargaining was made an
unfair labor practice and, even then, the right was limited.
By leaving gaps at such crucial points, Congress turned the decision
over to the courts. 73 The courts were, of course, likely to rely on the tools
168. Testimony of Francis J. Haas, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
143, 150 (1935).
169. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint
individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis." 29
U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000). Mediation is available through the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service if the parties request it. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-173.
170. Testimony of Elinore Morehouse Herrick, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 206, 211 (emphasis added); see also 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2320 (1935) (considering bill (S. 1958)
to promote equality of bargaining power between employers and employees, to diminish the
causes of labor disputes, and to create a National Labor Relations Board).
171. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2312; see also
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1986) (stating that the
employer and the union are "free to use their economic weapons against one another"). For
other choices made that have profoundly affected the effectiveness of the NLRA, see James
Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(discussing the clash between the Wagner Act's basis in the Commerce Clause and its basis
in the Thirteenth Amendment).
172. See generally Ellen Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations
Under the National Labor Relations Act and the Employment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. J.
RELATIONS ACT

INT'L L. & POL'Y 917 (1996).

173. The same situation occurred with regard to New Zealand's Employment Contracts
Act in 1991. For its first three years, the Employment Court interpreted the ECA to resolve
impasses also by permitting the employer to impose its terms based on a doctrine the court
developed and called a "partial lockout." The court said that the employer had locked
workers out of part of their terms when it unilaterally altered them. The cause for this
similar outcome for impasse resolution seems to have been the same. Both the ECA and
NLRA omitted any method for impasse resolution. The NLRA did so to be non-prescriptive,
while the ECA put its faith in the market. The legislature's failure to act forced the judiciary
to step in. Giving employers the right to impose terms was consistent with neither act. Ellen
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of the common law and incrementalism to aid them in interpreting a law
that was intended to radically overturn master and servant, property law,
and workplace control. In addition to making little effort to encourage the
parties to bargain as equals and to set workplace terms by consummating
an agreement, judicial decisions have limited the remedy for bad faith
bargaining to no more than an order to bargain in good faith, rather than
imposing monetary sanctions, requiring interest arbitration, imposing terms
or other effective sanctions that might, as required by § 10(c), "effectuate
the policies of this Act., 17 4 In short, history, chance, politics, changes in
social mores, and the accretive nature of legal analysis explain a great deal
about the inception and growth of the judicial impasse doctrines.175
The key lesson from experience with the development of judicial
doctrines altering the basic intent of the NLRA is that the Board and courts
will fill statutory gaps by developing structures to control bargaining and
the use of employer and union weapons. Failing to legislate as to a key
issue that is certain to arise opens the door for a result that may undercut
the entire purpose of the legislation.
III. ENDING THE DICTATOR GAME
Three things are key to restoring the NLRA's ultimatum game and
ending the dictator game. All are based in the need to help judges return to
their role as legislative interpreters and not legislators. First, judges need to
be sensitized to how the NLRA differs from the common law tradition that
frames their world view. Second, NLRA cases need to be tried so that a
record is developed that helps common law judges decide cases in a way
that promotes NLRA goals. Third, a principled and workable way must be
found to deal with the NLRA's gap in dealing with impasses.
A.

Sensitizing Judges to NLRA Goals
It is impossible to end the dictator game without being clear that the

Dannin & Clive Gilson, supra note 172.
174. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (holding that the National Labor
Relations Board has the power to require employees and employers to negotiate, but cannot
compel the employer to agree to a proposed checkoff clause). In other words, before
committing bad faith bargaining, the parties are required to bargain in good faith, and the
remedy for not doing so is solely an order to bargain in good faith. As a result, some now
argue that it is not really an unfair labor practice, because the duty to bargain in good faith is
meaningless. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 19, at pt. IV (studying the
impact of judicial decisions regarding bad faith bargaining).
175. For a full description, see Dannin, Collective Bargaining,supra note 69, at 64-65
(describing how the expansion of the concept of impasse has affected bargaining between
employers and unions); Earle, supra note 78 (discussing the development of the impasse
doctrine over time).
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NLRA fundamentally "violates" common law principles. Enforcing such a
law entails different strategies than when a law embodies the spirit of the
common law. Every aspect of NLRA cases must be handled with a
consciousness that the very purpose of the Act was to supplant key parts of
the law that controlled the workplace and that are still the default mode for
controlling workplace relations. Those who operate in this system often
forget just how uncomfortable the fit between our common law legal
tradition and the NLRA is. Just as law students must learn to think like
lawyers before they can understand the law in more than a rote way, so too
must non-labor lawyers learn to think like labor lawyers. Unfortunately, all
too often this is not done when cases are tried and then when they are
briefed and argued to the courts of appeals.
When I was a judicial law clerk and already knew I wanted a career in
labor law, I saw many cases argued on appeal by NLRB lawyers. With
only one exception, the arguments were rote and based on assumptions the
judges did not have. I could see that the judges left the bench puzzled and
with questions that were never answered. But lawyers need not argue cases
this way. In, unfortunately, the only case in which the NLRB attorney
spoke directly to the judges about the difficult parts of the case, she
provided a clear explanation as to why the law had been broken and what
must be done to enforce it. Rather than merely listening politely as they
had done with other NLRB lawyers, the judges peppered her with
questions, even asking for answers to general questions about labor law.
When the NLRB attorney sat down, it was easy to see that she had carried
the day.
When planning how to present an NLRA case at any level, attorneys
must be conscious of the fact that few judges today have been labor
lawyers, and few have law clerks who are planning to have a career in labor
law or a law clerk who has taken even a single labor law class. If judges
are to decide cases in a way that enforces the law-and judges do want to
enforce the law-someone has to answer the questions a judge will have
not only about a case, but also about the law and its policies. The best way
to do this is to anticipate those difficulties at every stage of the case and not
wait for the oral argument at the court of appeals.
It is sobering how few court cases ever refer to § l's goals and § 7's
methods for achieving those goals. When they do, the goal they most often
address is that of promoting labor peace. That is an easy goal for common
law judges to understand, but only in an oversimplified way that ignores
the components the NLRA's drafters intended to lead to real labor peace.
The difference is that a short term labor peace in a specific case can be
achieved by suppressing disagreement, a result utterly at odds with the
NLRA's goals. It neglects the importance of deciding cases aware of the
goals of preventing actions that depress wage rates and the purchasing
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power of wage earners and that prevent "the stabilization of competitive
17 6
wage rates and working conditions within and between industries."'
Suppressing disagreements ignores the goals of "restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees"'' 7 7 and "encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.' ' 78 It also ignores
"protecting the exercise by workers of [their] full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection.' ' 79 Every case must be tried in a way that
makes it impossible to evade the demands of these goals.
Indeed, although not every case goes to the court of appeals, lawyers
should approach every case as if it were headed there, so that judges have
the grounds to reverse the judicial amendments that defeat the NLRA's
purposes. There is no question that this means committing more resources
since this will take more time in case preparation and more time in trial and
post-trial briefing.
B.

Helping Common Law Judges Understandthe Consequences of What
They Are Doing

The key to reversing years of judicial amendments and ending the
dictator game judges have recreated thus is litigating NLRB cases in a
wholly different way. The judges who review NLRB cases are intelligent,
experienced lawyers. Unfortunately, for the most part, they are not
experienced in the NLRA and the significance of its role in promoting the
co-determination of working conditions. 8 ° Therefore, cases need to be
176. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. A study of the impact of judicial demographics on their decisions in NLRA appeals
found that few judges had NLRA experience. James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility
Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social Science Background Model to a Celebrated
Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1681, 1704-05, 1720 (1999). When judges had practiced
labor law, even on the management side, it made it more likely they would find for unions
in 8(a)(5) cases.
Section 8(a)(5) claims, on the other hand, raise issues more distinct from other
fields of appellate practice. These allegations focus on employer misconduct
directed at the union rather than at individual employees. They involve
complaints that the collective bargaining process is being undermined or
subverted, including charges that an employer refused to provide requested
information, engaged in surface bargaining, or improperly withdrew recognition
of the bargaining unit. To understand and assess these claims, judges must be
comfortable both with the protected nature of group action and with the
complex dynamics generated by a clash between two collective entities, the
union and the employer. There also are fewer analogues elsewhere in public law
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litigated in a way that respects judges' strengths while recognizing where
some will need information and assistance. In essence, this means that
lawyers should present judges with evidence that demonstrates how these
actions violate the Act's purposes, and not simply trying cases
mechanically, only putting the facts of a violation in evidence. It also
means that lawyers must introduce evidence as to what remedy is
appropriate and, at least until the process of reappraisal has taken hold,
including evidence as to why the current interpretations must be reversed.
In other words, have a phased strategy that recognizes which issues need to
be tackled first.
In order to succeed in the cases the NLRB prosecutes, it must create a
record that supports the violation alleged and the remedies sought. Simply
making arguments in briefs is insufficient. An example that demonstrates
this can be found in former General Counsel Rosemary Collyer's attempts
to make a modest change in remedies. She wanted to have all orders
require a "visitatorial" clause that would permit a Board agent access to an
employer's facility in order to ensure compliance with the other terms of a
court order.'18 Unfortunately, she relied solely on having each brief include
a boilerplate argument that a "visitatorial"clause should be an automatic

to claims that center on the paradigm of group action.
With this background, it is noteworthy that the results for our
section 8(a)(5) equation differ substantially from those for the other
equations

Conversely, judges with NLRA management experience displayed the largest
pro-union difference from their colleagues under section 8(a)(5). When the
Board rejected a union's 8(a)(5) bargaining claim, judges with NLRA
management experience were especially likely to reverse and protect the
union's position. This pattern supports the hypothesis that section 8(a)(5) claims
present particular challenges to the bench. Judges who supported the union
under other sections of the statute appeared less likely to register that support
under section 8(a)(5), while judges with the most experience interpreting and
litigating under
the
statute showed a special
propensity
to
protect union interests.
Id. at 1726-27.
181. Standard language was:
For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this Order, the
Board, or any of its duly authorized representatives, may obtain discovery from
Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or assigns, or any other person
having knowledge concerning any compliance matter, in the manner provided
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such discovery shall be conducted
under the supervision of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing this
Order and may be had upon any matter reasonably related to compliance with
this Order, as enforced by the Court.
Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1080 (1988).
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remedy. However, the courts and Board were unwilling to accept that
visitation clauses were necessary without evidence in the record.' 82 The
Board in Cherokee Marine Terminal stated:
Such a clause would permit the Board to examine the books and
records of a respondent and to take statements from its officers
and employees and others for the purpose of determining or
securing compliance with a court-enforced order. Counsel for the
General Counsel first requested this clause in the posthearing
brief to the judge pursuant to instructions from the General
Counsel as part of an effort to persuade the Board to include
visitatorial clauses in all remedial orders. Thus, the specific
request was based not on the facts of this case but on more
general arguments regarding the Board's enforcement powers
83
and recurring compliance problems in prior unrelated cases.
After losing a number of cases as a result of pursuing an argumentonly strategy, and not producing a trial record to support the request, the
General Counsel stopped pursuing visitatorial clauses. Only the creation of
record evidence that demonstrates the need to change course can restore the
NLRA to its intended role.
But where can lawyers find this evidence? It must come from social
scientists and others who have done and who will do research on these
issues, and from others whose experience qualifies them as experts. Their
work must be presented either as an exhibit, or, to be more effective, the
researchers themselves or other qualified social scientists may be called as
expert witnesses. Some of the research that can be used has been
completed, but much is yet to be done. When social scientists see that there
is a need for research in a particular area and that it is valued, they will
begin to do work in that area.
Experience with experts in other areas makes plain that this is not an
easy course. 8 4 Social scientists are not the only ones with expertise in this
182. See, e.g., Microimage Display Div. of Xidex Corp., Petitioner v. NLRB, 924 F.2d
245, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1988).
183. Cherokee Marine Terminal, 287 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1080 (1988).
184. Vice Chancellor Strine observes:
The adjudicative process obviously hampers the judge's ability to put her hands
on an unbiased, and sufficiently thorough, sample of the literature, much less to
understand it fully. The joyous and, at times, maddening complexity of the
human experience confounds the ability of social science to describe the way
things are with the certainty that is often achievable in some aspects of the
natural sciences. Judges reviewing a skewed and incomplete body of difficultto-understand social science articles whose composition is shaped largely by
time-pressured personal research and citations by self-interested litigating
adversaries must proceed with some hesitance. When possible, empirical
evidence should be presented through live, expert testimony so that the judge
can go beyond the cold page to an active dialogue with the social scientists on
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area. The experiences of union representatives, mediators, lawyers, and
employees can qualify them as experts. The point is that a whole new
group of witnesses addressing an entirely new set of issues must be brought
into NLRB trials.
Unfortunately, in order to do this, the insularity with which NLRA
cases are tried must be overcome. NLRB cases are prosecuted by an
NLRB regional office attorney and usually defended by an attorney who is
also well versed in labor law before an administrative law judge from the
NLRB' s Division of Judges. Thus, everyone at the typical NLRB trial is a
specialist in labor law operating with the shortcuts experts use. As a result,
trials are usually short and to the point. Because they are not jury trials and
because the parties normally file post-hearing briefs, there is no need to try
cases in a way that lays out evidence openly or provides much explanatory
context. As a result, Board cases are not tried in a way that is helpful to
common law judges.
It is possible, however, to try cases in a way that produces a record
that will provide guidance to judges who are not experts in labor law. One
example I can offer is again from my days as a law clerk; a large part of my
caseload was social security disability appeals. The cases were all short and
the transcripts and exhibits all followed a formula. The applicant was
briefly examined about the disability; a vocational expert was called about
jobs the applicant could perform; and a few documents were put into
evidence. In one case, however, the attorney veered off this path
dramatically. Rather than merely asking his client whether she was in pain
and to describe the pain, he periodically would ask her, "I notice you are
shifting in your seat constantly. Is there a reason for that?" "Yes." "What is
the reason?" "If I sit still for more than a few minutes, the pain in my back
gets so bad I can't bear it." "Would it help if you stood up?" "Yes." After a
few minutes of standing, the process repeated itself. The witness' testimony
and the medical records had stated-as did those of many other
applicants-that she was unable to sit or stand or lie down for more than a
few minutes without being in such pain she had to move to a different
position. In all the other cases, the witness had said nothing in the course
of examination that truly demonstrated suffering pain. In this case the
problem was not only stated, it was illustrated.
More cases need to be tried so they illustrate what is at stake. Nothing
less will restore the NLRA to its original purpose. This method requires
the lawyer trying the case to think about more than proving the facts of the
both sides of the question, aided by adversarial examinations. Even when that
technique is used to improve the judge's ability to assess empirical claims based
on social science research, common sense and modesty still counsel against the
adoption of eternal verities supposedly premised on the latest... scholarship.
Strine, supra note 153, at 516-17.
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case and meeting the opposing side's evidence. To reiterate, the lawyer
must provide evidence as to the goals of the NLRA and explain how a
discussion in the given case must correspond to those goals.
The discussion so far assumes that the counsel for the General
Counsel will be trying the case and presenting this sort of evidence. But
what if the General Counsel is unwilling to do so? In that case, and perhaps
in all cases, it is the unions who must intervene and be prepared to take the
lead on presenting this evidence. In the sorts of cases under discussion
here, the charging party will have been the union, and the union will thus
be a party to the case.""' It makes sense for unions to be prepared to take on
this role. No one but the unions involved will have such a strong need to
take the steps necessary to change this law. The bottom line is that both the
general counsel and union counsel or representatives must provide
the
186
judge with the record evidence the judge needs to enforce the statute.
Although this article focuses only on the judicial impasse
amendments, this new way of trying cases provides a useful way of
"amending" the NLRA-and perhaps the only way to get the NLRA to
address the many aspects of the law that have angered unions. These
include inadequate remedies and election processes.
While perhaps not as straightforward as new legislation and starting
from a clean slate, it has to be remembered that the process of legislating
does not guarantee success nor is it less expensive. Before a new statute
can be passed, there must be agreement on the contents of such a statute
accompanied by intense lobbying. Given the current political climate,
there can be no question that the NLRA is the best statute labor can hope
for now and probably for years to come. It is better to accept that reality
and work to improve what exists.
This work should be engaged in with enthusiasm. This is not settling
for second best. The NLRA is basically a sound law, and unions need to
acknowledge that they would be lucky to get another as good. The work for
now is to wipe away the accumulation of years of judicial activism that
have tarnished its luster.
C.

Filling Gaps in the NLRA

If we are to reinstate collective bargaining as an ultimatum game, the
NLRA must be enforced in a way that advances the Act's goals: promoting
185. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994). The NLRB Rules and Regulations §§ 110.10(a), 102.8,
102.29, and 102.38 and Unfair Labor Practice Casehandling Manual §§ 10380.3 and
10388.1 provide for such a role.
186. See Strine, supra note 153, at 514-15 (describing the need for judges to consider
"new information about the world" derived from social science research to update the
common law).
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workplace co-determination; removing industrial strife and unrest; creating
equality of bargaining power; encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining; "protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 187 To do so, we must
prepare the ground by developing a reasoned understanding of how to
resolve bargaining impasses. Merely reversing the rights of an employer to
implement its final offer upon impasse, to lockout workers, or to replace
strikers recreates the conditions that led to this problem-leaving a gap. It
gives judges no assistance.
If we start from the NLRA as enacted, it appears that the drafters
intended to create a self-adjusting system that allowed both parties to use
the full range of economic weapons and other methods of persuasion
available to them-excluding only those that violated the law. This
suggests turning to a pure contractual bargaining model with the one
exception that such a contract must be negotiated in the context of an
ongoing relationship.
Imagine, then, that instead of employer implementation at impasse,
the law required the parties to stay in status quo until they reached an
agreement, essentially the commercial model of contracting, in a world of
buyers and sellers with equal bargaining power. 8 8 Not only would this
recreate the NLRA's original language and intent, there appear to be a
number of advantages over the current system. First, the workplace would
be governed by terms the parties had once agreed were sensible for all.
Changes to those terms would depend on whether a party had more to gain
from retaining the current terms than by altering them and whether one
party could or would offer inducements that would induce a reluctant party
to agree. As negotiation helped both parties see gains from agreeing to new
terms, this system should push them to narrow their differences. They
would be forced to learn what each side's concerns were, to compose their
differences, and to create rules for governing the needs of this specific
workplace.' 89 Such a contract would embody the concept that unions "are
187. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
188. Of course, there could be many other commercial models that would be closer to
the situation in the employment relationship. First, employment is normally a long-term
relationship. The Detroit automobile companies have forged long term relationships with
many of their suppliers. Consider what would be the impact if Ford, for example,
unilaterally cut the price it would pay a small supplier for whom Ford was its only or its
most important customer. Another commercial model close to that of employment would be
that of rental housing, where there may be long term relationships and high costs associated
with exit-e.g., losing a place that has become home, searching for a satisfactory substitute,
and all the work and cost of moving.
189. A contract that embodies this tension well is the one between a New Zealand auto
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not married to a system of narrow job classifications or adversarial
shopfloor labor relations; they are willing to cooperate and participate."'' 90
However, a pure contractual model is not without problems. We also
have to assume that despite legislation intended to promote equality of
bargaining power, inequalities will remain. Requiring both employer and
union to agree may create new opportunities for gaming the system. A
party with little bargaining power who preferred the status quo could
prevent change simply by saying, "No." Or a party with low bargaining
power could blackmail a bargaining partner who had a strong desire for
change. The result of this stalemate could be detrimental to the workplace
and by extension to the economy.
The issue of stalemate and the desire to end it as expeditiously as
possible is the problem that led to the creation of the judicial impasse
plant and one of the unions representing workers there. The contract declares that employer
and worker interests differ in important respects; despite this, it says, each party agrees to
promote the other's interests:
The parties to this contract recognise the employer's objective of retaining and
promoting a profitable business by providing its customers with high quality
vehicles at competitive prices, and recognise the employees' objective of
retaining jobs and reasonable living standards and working conditions. It is
acknowledged that the industry operates in a highly competitive environment
which is influenced by government policies on tariffs. Without sub-ordinating
either party to the objectives of the other, the parties agree to cooperate in
achieving their objectives.
The parties agree that:
-employees will be provided with the opportunity to influence decisions that
affect them in the work place.
-quality will be put first.
-within the parameters of this contract a well trained and flexible work force
will be maintained.
-the importance and contribution of all to the success of the company is
recognized.
-they will treat each other with respect and dignity.
-they will act at all times in a safe, fair and honest manner.
-they will promote employee and employer behavior that is consistent with
accepted standards of conduct.
-they will develop communication channels and systems that will keep all
employees informed of things that affect them in the work place.
-they will resolve problems in a non-adversarial manner where possible based
on consensus.
Collective Employment Contract, 1996-1997, C1.1.1, Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd.
-Todd Park Employees (on file with author).
190. Voos, supra note 73, at 17.
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amendments. There are only two ways to deal with an impasse in
bargaining: intervene to a greater or lesser degree or let the parties work it
out themselves as long as they violate no laws, in much the same way as
federal discovery works. The only boundaries are that whatever system is
in place, it must not infringe on the NLRA's fundamental values and must
be one that meets all parties' needs.
If the interventionist route is taken, interest arbitration should be
considered. In a bargaining simulation comparing three different systems
for resolving bargaining impasses, interest arbitration was viewed the most
favorably by the employer and union participants. 9' Congress considered
this system when drafting the NLRA, rejected it, enacting the nonintrusive
system instead.' 92 This history suggests that we may have to respect that
judgment as precluding interpreting the law to include it now.
A more substantial argument is that there is no way to require interest
arbitration upon impasse without legislating. There is no question that it
would be a major innovation. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be a greater
innovation than when judges allowed one party to control terms when an
impasse was reached. Unlike implementation, interest arbitration does not
itself undercut the express language and goals of the Act. In addition, there
are many varieties of interest arbitration, some of which may be less
intrusive than others. Such a change must come from the legislature. If
judges were wrong to create implementation upon impasse, then it is hard
to support the judicial creation of an interest arbitration system triggered by
impasse.
Interest arbitration, however, might be an appropriate remedy for bad
faith bargaining. Section 10(c) requires that remedies promote the
purposes and policies of the Act, and a system of interest arbitration could
be created and tailored to the needs of specific cases in order to support
collective bargaining and restore equality of bargaining power. As such,
Gissel bargaining orders might be a useful model. Normally bargaining
orders are a remedy for bad faith bargaining, but in the case of a Gissel
bargaining order, they are a remedy for employer unfair labor practices of
such gravity that employees are unable to have fair elections of
representatives. As such it becomes a second best method for enforcing the
choice employees made when a majority of them signed cards designating
the union as their representative at a time before the employer's anti-union
campaign began. Similar to Gissel bargaining orders, interest arbitration as
a remedy would also be appropriate in order to deprive the party who acted
illegally of the fruits of that behavior.
This still leaves the parties with no method of resolving bargaining
191. Dannin & Singh, The Force of Law, supra note 75; Singh & Dannin, Simulated
Study, supra note 75.
192. Dannin & Singh, The Force of Law, supra note 75.
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impasses other than negotiating their way out of them.
This
noninterventionist option may not be as unworkable as is feared. Impasses
of any duration could become relatively rare once the employer no longer
has an incentive to reach an impasse and instead has some incentive to
move past an impasse. In addition, mediation is generally available now.
In a world in which implementation is not available, the parties might make
greater use of mediation services. It may even be that if interest arbitration
is available as a remedy, an employer will be more interested in reaching a
negotiated agreement as opposed to risking the terms an arbitrator might
choose. If these predictions are correct, then there is less need for the
Board to have an impasse resolution procedure as a matter of course.
Striker replacement is a more difficult issue, because it has been
sanctioned to some degree by the Supreme Court and by amendments to
the Act itself.'93 However, there are many details of the right to replace that
have not been ruled on. For example, employers have been permitted to
replace economic strikers as a right. Social science research could
demonstrate that experience with replacement shows that the right should
be more regulated rather than allowing employers to decide unilaterally
whether to make replacements permanent or temporary. For example
under the existing law, while an employer might continue to have the right
to replace strikers temporarily, that is, only for the duration of the strike, an
employer could not hire permanent replacements unless it could
demonstrate that its business would be seriously harmed.' 94
Such a standard, of course, bears its own risk that the process of
incrementalism and common law traditions that see a workplace as an
employer's property and continue to use concepts from master and servant
law would gradually make such a burden of proof meaningless. This risk
continues, however, under all versions of labor law that are not rooted in
common law concepts.
In any case, whatever methods are substituted to resolve impasses and
deal with the situations now controlled by the judicial impasse
amendments, it is important to bear in mind that the law should not permit
a party to reap rewards from behavior that does not comport with the
NLRA. Otherwise it will be tempted not to negotiate. That is simply
human nature and is a danger that must be kept in check.
IV. CONCLUSION

This article has explored the extent to which the judicial impasse
amendments have rewritten the NLRA contrary to its express language and
193. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
194. For a discussion of this issue, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
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the processes that led to this extraordinary degree of judicial activism,
supplanting the system of workplace governance set in place by Congress.
These judicial amendments are among the factors that led the Human
Rights Watch to conclude that U.S. labor law violates international human
rights standards 195 and to prompt calls for the NLRA's replacement. There

is no easy solution. Labor law is in a desperate state, but it is unlikely that
a better law can be enacted. The best answer is to harness the very
processes that created the problem-judicial interpretations-in the service
of restoring the NLRA as a means of promoting equality of bargaining
power, or, put another way, making the ultimatum game the only game in
town.

195. HUMAN RIGHTS

WATCH,

supra note 19, at pt. I.

